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This dissertation investigates how the investment climate affects firm dynamics, productiv-
ity, and macroeconomic performance across countries. The first chapter provides an empirical
analysis of the macroeconomic impact of business regulation. It first characterizes the stylized
facts on regulation across the world, using a set of newly constructed, comprehensive indicators of
regulation in a large number of countries in the 1990s. These indicators are then used to study the
effects of regulation on economic growth and macroeconomic volatility employing cross-country
regression analysis. The analysis allows for the effects of regulation to vary with the country’s
level of institutional development, and it also controls for the likely endogeneity of regulation with
respect to macroeconomic performance. Results show that a heavier regulatory burden reduces
growth and increases volatility, although these effects are smaller the higher the quality of the
overall institutional framework.
The second chapter focuses on the mechanism through which regulation impacts on macroe-
conomic outcomes, and assesses the role of firm entry and exit as channel of transmission of the
effects of regulation on productivity growth. We use sector and manufacturing-wide productivity
and firm turnover data derived from firm-level information for OECD and Latin American coun-
tries to explore the effects of various types of regulations –product-market regulation, labor-market
regulation and fiscal regulation– following a two-step approach. The first step examines the im-
pact of regulatory barriers on firm turnover. The second assesses the effects of firm turnover on
productivity growth. Results provide partial evidence that regulation, particularly product market
regulation, hampers productivity growth by deterring firm entry and exit.
The third chapter investigates the effects of regulation uncertainty on the innovative behav-
ior of firms, and on the efficiency of the Schumpeterian “creative destruction” process. It argues
that regulation uncertainty, caused by a poor institutional environment, distorts the selection pro-
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ductivity, size, and innovative investments, having similar effects as an increase in the magnitude
of the cost. This indicates that, in addition to the level of regulation, unpredictability of regulation
is an important source of inefficiency in the reallocation process.
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Chapter 1
Regulation and Macroeconomic Performance
1.1 Introduction
Regulation of goods and factor markets is purportedly enacted to serve specific social pur-
poses. In reality, however, it obeys a more complex political economy process, where legitimate
social goals are mixed with the objectives of particular interest groups concerning the level and
distribution of rents. But regulation also has potentially important effects on economic perfor-
mance that have attracted increasing attention in recent years. According to a commonly held
view, excessive regulation is the prime cause of Europe’s macroeconomic underperformance over
the last decade vis-à-vis the United States (see Blanchard 2004). Likewise, intricate regulation and
its arbitrary enforcement are listed by the World Bank (2004) among the key obstacles to growth
in developing countries.
The key mechanism through which regulation affects aggregate economic performance is
the Schumpeterian process of “creative destruction” at the core of the growth engine in market
economies - the continuous restructuring and factor reallocation through which new technologies
replace the old (Aghion and Howitt 1992, Caballero and Hammour, 1996). There is ample evidence
that the shift of resources away from less productive and toward more efficient production units
accounts for much of the observed growth in aggregate productivity.1 The macroeconomic impact
of regulation arises primarily from its effects on the dynamics of restructuring.2 In particular,
regulatory barriers that disrupt the process of resource reallocation tend to cause a deterioration
in aggregate economic performance by allowing low-productivity activities to survive too long, and
discouraging the adoption of new high-productivity activities (Caballero and Hammour, 1998).
A recent empirical literature has examined the impact of various kinds of regulation on
1See for example Haltiwanger (2000) and Ahn (2001).
2For theoretical linkages between regulation and firm dynamics see, for instance, Pakes and McGuire (1994),
Hopenhayn (1992), Bergoeing et al., (2004), and Chapter 3 of this thesis. See also Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001)
for an insightful model highlighting the macroeconomics of labor and product market regulation.
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proximate determinants of GDP growth - productivity, investment and employment- finding for
the most part negative effects. In this vein, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) find that product market
regulation lowers multifactor productivity growth in OECD countries, while Bassanini and Ernst
(2002) report a negative effect of regulation on innovation. Alesina et al. (2002) likewise find that
product market regulations have a negative effect on private investment in OECD economies. In
turn, Nicoletti et al. (2001a,b) provide empirical evidence that anti-competitive regulation reduces
employment in a panel of industrial countries, while CEPR-IFS (2003) find that increased product
market competition encouraged by deregulation raises both investment and employment in a panel
data set covering OECD countries.3 Regarding labor regulation Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)
and Heckman and Pagés (2000) find that hiring and firing restrictions discourage employment
creatiofn in European and Latin American economies, respectively. Moreover, simulations for
OECD economies suggest that the effects of output and labor regulation on aggregate investment
and employment are quantitatively considerable (Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti, 2004).
A few empirical studies tackle the impact of regulation and deregulation on aggregate growth
in a cross-country setting. Koedijk and Kremers (1996) find a negative association between mea-
sures of product market regulation and GDP growth among 11 European countries. In contrast,
they find that labor regulations have no significant association with growth performance. Dutz and
Hairy (1999) apply extreme-bounds analysis to estimate the contribution to growth of a variety of
(mostly subjective) regulation and competition indicators in a sample of industrial and developing
countries. They find significant effects of measures of anti-trust policy and the average age of
large firms (taken as proxy for entry and exit barriers). However, Card and Freeman (2002) fail
to find any significant association between subjective measures of economic regulation and growth
performance in a panel regression covering OECD countries over 1970-99.
In this Chapter, we present a comprehensive empirical assessment of the macroeconomic
effects of regulation in a large sample of industrial and developing countries. We focus on two
key measures of macroeconomic performance, namely the growth and volatility of real GDP. Our
3In contrast, CEPR-IFS (2003) finds that the impact of product market competition on aggregate productivity
growth is less robust: the effect is positive only when the cross-country variation is taken into consideration, and
negative when the estimates are computed using the within-country variation.
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empirical strategy relies on the inclusion of suitable indicators of regulation into simple empiri-
cal equations relating these aggregate performance measures to standard control variables taken
from the macroeconomics and growth literature. While we do not characterize the specific channel
through which the aggregate impact of regulation unfolds, our approach allows us to obtain a sum-
mary measure of the magnitude of such impact that combines the action of the various intervening
mechanisms factor reallocation, capital accumulation, competition and innovation considered in
the literature.
Our analysis extends the literature along four dimensions. First, we provide a broad char-
acterization of business regulation around the world. Drawing from a variety of data sources, we
build a set of synthetic indicators capturing the regulations that firms face in the multiple dimen-
sions of their activity entry and exit, trade, taxes, contract enforcement, labor and finance. One
novel feature of these indicators is that they go beyond de jure regulation and incorporate, to a
significant extent, the burden of de facto regulation. Using this information, we document the
stylized facts of regulation across the world, regarding the extent of regulation in different coun-
tries, its relation with per capita income, and the observed relationship between different types of
regulation.
Second, unlike the existing literature on the macroeconomic impact of regulation, which has
focused almost exclusively on aggregate growth or its proximate determinants, we examine also
the effect of regulation on aggregate volatility. This is of independent interest for several reasons.
On the one hand, recent literature suggests that excessive regulation can lead to microeconomic
inflexibility (Caballero, Engel and Micco 2004). This tends to hamper the economy’s ability to
absorb shocks requiring microeconomic reallocation, thus amplifying their aggregate impact. On
the other hand, certain kinds of product market regulation such as those on entry and exit act as
barriers to firm creation and destruction and might have the opposite effect, attenuating cyclical
output fluctuations. Hence, the impact of regulation on volatility is a priori ambiguous, and can
be established only empirically. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at addressing this issue.
Third, we take into account the fact that the effects of regulation are likely to depend not only
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on the quantity of regulation, but also on its quality. There are good reasons for this. On analytical
grounds, certain types of regulation such as those designed to enhance competition in goods or
financial markets should be expected to exert beneficial effects on economic performance, rather
than adverse ones.4 More generally, countries with better institutions tend to create regulatory
environments genuinely aimed to improve business conditions rather than privilege a few interest
groups. They are also more likely to enforce regulation in a transparent and even-handed manner,
limiting the regulator’s margin for arbitrariness and corruption that can place many firms at a
disadvantage, sometimes forcing them to operate in the informal sector.5 All these arguments
suggest that the quality of regulation is likely to be closely related to overall governance quality,
and thus in our experiments we use standard governance indicators to capture regulatory quality.
Fourth, our empirical approach also allows for the possibility that aggregate performance
may itself be one of the factors weighing on policy makers’ decision to adopt regulatory measures.
Low growth or excessive macroeconomic volatility may make it more likely for the authorities to
introduce or tighten regulation e.g., adopting strict labor regulations or raising firm exit barriers
in the hope of containing job and output losses in downswings. Thus, any observed association
between regulation and macroeconomic performance could reflect causality from the latter to the
former rather than (or in addition to) the reverse. To ensure that our results reflect the causal
effect of regulations on growth and volatility, we also report empirical results from instrumental
variable estimations.
Before proceeding, we should note one important caveat of our analysis. Our objective
is limited to studying the macroeconomic consequences of regulation. It is not our purpose to
evaluate the success of specific regulations at meeting their stated objectives, nor do we pretend
to judge the impact of regulation on social welfare dimensions beyond the influence of economic
growth and volatility.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the synthetic regulation
indicators and presents some stylized facts concerning the patterns of regulation across industrial
4For instance, Klapper et al. (2004) find that certain regulations, such as entry and exit barriers, have negative
effects on firm entry, whereas others, like investors’ rights regulations, have positive effects.
5See for instance De Soto (1989).
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and developing countries. Section 3 reports estimates of the impact of regulation on growth and
aggregate volatility. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
1.2 Business regulation around the world
We now turn to the description of the nature and extent of business regulation around the
world. In this section, we first give an account of the areas of economic activity under regulation
on which we focus and describe how we measure regulation in each of them. Next, we discuss
differences in regulation intensity across regions of the world and give a preview of the relationship
between regulation and macroeconomic variables.
1.2.1 A typology of regulation
Our departure point is the assumption that the macroeconomic impact of business regula-
tion arises from its effects on firm dynamics. Therefore, we select the relevant areas of business
regulation by looking for them at the three stages of the life of a firm: entry, growth, and exit.
In most countries, all three are regulated to some degree; for instance, in virtually all countries
entrepreneurs need to follow a number of procedures to start a firm, although the burden of the ad-
ministrative process varies widely across countries.6 Once a firm is legally registered and allowed
to operate, its decisions are conditioned by regulations on hiring and firing workers, taxes, safety
standards, environmental regulations, interest rate controls, trade barriers, legal procedures, etc.7
Finally, a firm going out of business must again follow a sometimes costly and lengthy procedure.
1.2.2 How does regulation alter firm dynamics?
Regulation certainly affects firms’ decisions, but does it improve the conditions for their
activities or, on the contrary, does it impose unnecessary restrictions that increase costs and reduce
productivity? Although we do not rule out the first option, we should recognize the potentially
distortive effects of regulation on firms’ decisions and ultimately on macro performance. We
6See Djankov et al. (2002).
7Some regulations have also “indirect” effects on firm dynamics, for instance, Berkowitz and White (2002) find
that personal bankruptcy laws play an important role in small firms’ access to credit in the U.S.
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consider seven main areas of a firm’s activity subject to regulation: entry, exit, labor markets,
fiscal burden, international trade, financial markets, and contract enforcement; for each area, we
construct an index of the severity of regulation. Rather than restricting our measures of regulation
strictly to legal directives, we want to account for the practical restrictions and complications
brought about by certain rules. The regulation of entry index aims at capturing the actual difficulty
that an entrepreneur faces to start a business, from a legal perspective as well as in practice. The
index of bankruptcy regulation should reflect the speed and efficiency of the bankruptcy process; in
particular how well the justice system establishes priorities for creditors and enforces compensation.
With the labor market regulation index, we want to measure how difficult it is for a firm to adjust
its labor force. The measure should also include information about the wage setting system of
the country, and the power of organized labor. The index of fiscal burden aims at measuring the
burden to firms imposed by taxation and fiscal spending, an element that determines in many cases
a firm’s choice of location. With the trade regulation index we look at how much countries protect
domestic producers; specifically we are interested in measuring the cost for the entire economy of
protecting a selected group of producers. The financial markets regulation index should capture
how easy a firm’s access to capital markets is. For instance, special credit conditions for some
industries, or interest rate controls can reduce the availability of credit to more deserving firms
and distort incentives for investment. Finally, the contract enforcement index is a general measure
of how easily firms can turn to the justice system to resolve legal disputes.
1.2.3 Measuring regulation
We use six data sources for the construction of our indices: Doing Business (The World
Bank Group), Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation), Economic Freedom of the
World (The Fraser Institute), Labor Market Indicators Database (M. Rama and R. Artecona,
2000), The Corporate Tax Rates Survey (KPMG), and International Country Risk Guide (The
PRS Group). These sources cover the largest number of countries and areas under regulation, and
their measures use a clear methodology and are straightforward. Except for the Labor Market
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Indicators Database, all sources are public. Our sample covers 76 countries.8 In most cases, data
are based on surveys conducted in a single year (in the late 1990’s) in a large group of countries;
for components with observations for more than one year, we use average values over the period.
Therefore, our indices should be interpreted as average regulation levels in the late 1990’s. We
should note, however, that regulation tends to stay constant over long periods of time.9
Each index measures the intensity of the regulatory system on a scale from 0 to 1 (1 rep-
resenting the heaviest regulation). In order to be able to combine all components, we apply the
following standardization formula to each one of them:
Xi −Xmin
Xmax −Xmin
if higher values of X indicate heavier regulation and
Xmax −Xi
Xmax −Xmin
if lower values of X indicate heavier regulation.
We then obtain an index of regulation for each area of business activity outlined above by
matching each component to one activity, and taking the simple average of the components within
each activity.
The entry regulation index combines the number of legal steps required to register a new
business with an indicator of the overall legal burden of registration and willingness of the govern-
ment to facilitate the process and intervene minimally. The index of labor regulation combines the
percentage of workers that belong to a union, the minimum mandatory working conditions, and
the degree of hiring and firing flexibility granted by the law. The index of fiscal burden measures
direct taxation -that is, the maximum tax rate applied to individuals and businesses- and fiscal
spending. The index of trade barriers combines an indicator of average tariffs with one that mea-
8We do not consider here the heterogeneity of regulation within countries. This can be important in some cases,
such as the added burden of local taxation in federal systems. At present, however, very few data sources provide
information on regulation at the regional level. One of these sources is the Investment Climate Survey of The World
Bank, which records data on investment climate and activities of over 14,000 firms in about 30 countries.
9See, for instance, Bolaky and Freund (2004).
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sures the existence of hidden import barriers, and an indicator of the additional cost of importing
generated by mandatory administrative procedures (tariff costs, fees for obtaining licenses, bank
fees, etc.). The index of financial markets regulation measures the degree of government interven-
tion in the financial market, interest rate controls, ownership of banks, entry barriers, restrictions
in securities markets, and competition between domestic and foreign banks. The index of lack of
contract enforcement combines the number of legal procedures for disputes that are taken to court,
with a measure of the stability of the bureaucracy and its sensitivity to political changes in the
government. Finally, the index of bankruptcy regulation measures the efficiency of the bankruptcy
process by combining the time and cost of insolvency, the enforcement of priority of claims, the
extent to which the efficient outcome is achieved, and the degree of court involvement in the pro-
cess. Rather than just summarize de jure regulation, our measures capture to a large extent its
actual burden on economic agents. However, a caveat is necessary: our indices, as well as their
components, do not provide full information about the quality of regulation; in particular, they
do not reflect completely either the extent to which regulation corrects for market failures or the
political and social context in which regulation is implemented. These distinctions are important
because, as already noted, the economic impact of regulation may be dependent on institutional
country characteristics.10 We attempt to account for this issue in the econometric section of this
Chapter.
1.2.4 Regulation around the world
How do entry, growth and exit regulations vary across world regions? Although governments
oversee and extract revenues from business activities in all countries -and quite heavily in many–
there is considerable variation in the intensity of regulation across regions.
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics of the seven indices mentioned above. Industrial
countries tend to adopt heavy fiscal regulation, medium labor regulation, and low regulation in
trade, financial markets, entry, bankruptcy, and contract enforcement. Developing regions cannot
be characterized as simply as the OECD as they show varying patterns for each type of regulation.
10See, for instance, Claessens and Klapper (2002).
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics of regulation indices by region
Indicator No. Mean Std. Min Max Indicator No. Mean Std. Min Max
Obs. Dev. Obs. Dev.
Africa East Asia and Pacific
Entry 17 0.419 0.120 0.186 0.680 Entry 6 0.311 0.118 0.166 0.512
Financial Mkt. 17 0.541 0.137 0.319 0.808 Financial Mkt. 6 0.382 0.064 0.273 0.445
Contracts 17 0.631 0.195 0.367 0.988 Contracts 6 0.428 0.100 0.293 0.597
Trade 17 0.718 0.182 0.333 0.944 Trade 6 0.538 0.243 0.345 1.000
Labor 16 0.444 0.178 0.185 0.767 Labor 6 0.372 0.184 0.135 0.537
Fiscal 17 0.497 0.132 0.311 0.751 Fiscal 6 0.415 0.059 0.358 0.499
Bankruptcy 12 0.485 0.147 0.321 0.742 Bankruptcy 5 0.524 0.183 0.277 0.762
Product Mkt. 17 0.571 0.121 0.370 0.769 Product Mkt. 6 0.437 0.082 0.339 0.536
Overall 17 0.541 0.098 0.375 0.702 Overall 6 0.423 0.061 0.337 0.495
OECD Latin America and Caribbean
Entry 22 0.177 0.107 0.011 0.367 Entry 21 0.384 0.124 0.171 0.685
Financial Mkt. 22 0.190 0.126 0.016 0.441 Financial Mkt. 21 0.427 0.175 0.111 0.789
Contracts 22 0.215 0.094 0.000 0.419 Contracts 21 0.647 0.164 0.341 0.927
Trade 22 0.114 0.072 0.000 0.276 Trade 21 0.574 0.169 0.248 0.881
Labor 21 0.444 0.168 0.132 0.783 Labor 21 0.558 0.154 0.258 0.773
Fiscal 22 0.705 0.131 0.390 0.917 Fiscal 21 0.359 0.117 0.105 0.529
Bankruptcy 21 0.238 0.168 0.000 0.675 Bankruptcy 17 0.454 0.143 0.171 0.655
Product Mkt. 22 0.186 0.086 0.084 0.330 Product Mkt. 21 0.501 0.104 0.329 0.767
Overall 22 0.296 0.081 0.165 0.411 Overall 21 0.488 0.077 0.339 0.638
Middle East and North Africa South Asia
Entry 6 0.322 0.071 0.230 0.396 Entry 4 0.331 0.075 0.234 0.404
Financial Mkt. 6 0.582 0.327 0.308 1.000 Financial Mkt. 4 0.465 0.077 0.379 0.541
Contracts 6 0.544 0.115 0.439 0.753 Contracts 4 0.468 0.148 0.261 0.605
Trade 6 0.868 0.123 0.653 1.000 Trade 4 0.797 0.173 0.553 0.963
Labor 6 0.476 0.110 0.340 0.648 Labor 4 0.411 0.056 0.352 0.486
Fiscal 6 0.711 0.126 0.516 0.908 Fiscal 4 0.484 0.125 0.308 0.600
Bankruptcy 6 0.434 0.089 0.337 0.589 Bankruptcy 4 0.360 0.147 0.148 0.479
Product Mkt. 6 0.550 0.081 0.486 0.675 Product Mkt. 4 0.484 0.044 0.423 0.528
Overall 6 0.562 0.059 0.514 0.660 Overall 4 0.474 0.034 0.424 0.498
Source: Authors’ estimation
For example, with respect to the OECD, labor regulation is almost 16% lower in East Asia and
the Pacific, while 26% higher in Latin America and the Caribbean.11 The most striking difference
between the OECD and developing-country groups is in trade regulation, where all developing
regions have indices at least 150% higher than the OECD group, reaching an enormous 710%
difference in the case of the Middle East and Northern Africa. On the other hand, in the case of
fiscal regulation, differences across regions are not nearly as pronounced.
Which countries regulate the most? Although heavy regulators are mainly found among
11These numbers are calculated on the basis of Table 1, for example, the mean of the “Labor” indicator is 0.44
in the OECD and 0.37 in the EAP region, so that the difference is (0.37 − 0.44) ∗ 100/0.44 = −15.9%.
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developing countries, OECD countries rank highest in fiscal regulation: Belgium ranks number
one, Italy number two, and France is number four (Syria is number three).
The country with the lowest fiscal-regulation score is Haiti.12 On average, labor regulation
is highest in Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by the Middle East and Northern Africa.
OECD countries do not have high labor regulation on average, but they do exhibit large dispersion:
over the entire sample (all regions combined), Portugal has the highest labor regulation score while
the United States has the lowest. In the remaining areas OECD countries always occupy the bottom
of the distribution. For instance, The Netherlands reaches the lowest score in financial regulation,
Finland in bankruptcy and trade, Iceland in contract enforcement, and Canada in entry regulation.
The harshest regulatory environments are in Sierra Leone (contract enforcement), Haiti (entry),
Syria and Iran (financial markets), Tunisia and Papua New Guinea (trade), and the Philippines
(bankruptcy).
Table 1.2: Correlation coefficients between regulation indices
Entry Financial Contract Trade Bankruptcy Labor Fiscal
Markets Enforcement Burden
Entry 1
Financial Markets 0.6686* 1
Contract Enforcement 0.6747 * 0.6034* 1
Trade 0.6373* 0.7269* 0.6246* 1
Bankruptcy 0.5236* 0.4415* 0.5301* 0.5078* 1
Labor 0.4127* 0.1415 0.4665* 0.0702 0.1413 1
Fiscal -0.5045* -0.2824* -0.5714* -0.3386* -0.3770* -0.1806 1
1st Princ. Comp. 0.8594* 0.7737* 0.8600* 0.8551* 0.7111* 0.2923* -0.5715*
2nd Princ. Comp. 0.1057 -0.3769* 0.1597 -0.2823* -0.0274 0.9007* -0.1069
3rd Princ. Comp. 0.1605 0.3393* -0.0921 0.1672 -0.1536 0.2778* 0.7632*




Fiscal -0.4985* -0.1806 1
Overall 0.9678* 0.4445* -0.3263* 1
1st Princ. Comp. 0.9798* 0.2923* -0.5715* 0.9348*
2nd Princ. Comp. -0.1453 0.9007* -0.1069 -0.0037
3rd Princ. Comp. 0.1131 0.2778* 0.7632* 0.3315*
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level.
Source: Authors’ estimation
12Keep in mind that the rank of a country is relative to the sample, therefore changing the composition of the
sample will most likely alter the ranking as well.
10
Table 1.2 shows simple correlations between the regulation indices. The strongly positive
correlations among all but the fiscal burden and labor indices suggest that regulation policy comes
in “packages”. Judging from these correlations, we can distinguish three regulation categories:
fiscal burden, labor, and “product market,” where the latter is a composite of the entry, trade,
financial markets, bankruptcy, and contract enforcement indices.13 We obtain the product market
index by averaging the scores of the five components; we also compute an “overall” regulation
index by averaging the scores of all seven components. We choose to give equal weights to all
components despite the strong correlation among the first five because we don’t have any priors
about the importance of labor market or fiscal regulation relative to the others.
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Fiscal Burden Index
Note: AFR: Africa region, EAP: East Asia and Pacific region, INL: OECD, LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean
region, MNA: Middle East and North Africa region, SAS: South Asia region
The arrangement of the regulation indices into these three groups receives additional sta-
tistical support from factor analysis. The first three principal components obtained from factor
13The term “product market regulations” is taken from Nicoletti et al. (2000).
11
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Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
analysis of the seven basic indices explain, respectively, 53%, 15%, and 12% of their overall vari-
ance. These principal components have a close one-to-one match with the indices resulting from
the three categories. For the first principal component, the five “product market” regulation in-
dices receive high and similar loadings, and not so the labor and fiscal regulation indices. For
the second principal component, the labor regulation index receives the highest loading, while the
other six indices get only low positive or negative weights. Analogously, the third principal com-
ponent loads heavily only on the tax regulation index. The close connection between the principal
components and our regulation categories is clearly demonstrated by the pattern of correlation
coefficients shown in Table 1.2.14
Figure 1.1 provides a regional comparison of the overall, product market, fiscal, and labor
regulation indices. In addition, figure 1.2 depicts scatter plots of these indices against the (the log
14Other studies, such as Nicoletti et al. (2000) or Klapper et al. (2004) also use factor analysis to decompose
regulation measures, and they further replace the measures with their principal components in the regressions.
Because of the strong correlation between the components and our indices (see Table 1.2), we choose not to use the
principal components in our regressions.
12
of) GDP per capita of all countries in the sample. Looking at the first three panels, it becomes
clear that employment regulation, fiscal burden, and product market regulation stand apart from
each other. Indeed, while there seems to be little relation between a country’s average income
and the strength of labor regulation, the relationship with income is positive and significant in the
case of fiscal burden and clearly negative in the case of product market regulation. The overall
regulation index is negatively related to per capita GDP, which is not surprising given the large
weight of product market regulation in the overall index.
1.2.5 Regulation and governance
The effect of regulation on firm dynamics and, ultimately, macroeconomic performance
is likely to depend on the institutional context in which regulation is enacted. For example,
countries with better institutions create regulatory environments that actually try to improve
business conditions rather than privilege a few interest groups; they also limit the interaction
between regulation and abuses of power in the public sector that place many firms in disadvantage,
sometimes forcing them to operate in the informal sector (see for instance De Soto, 1989). We use
an index of “governance quality” in order to assess the quality of regulation itself and the general
context that determines how regulation functions. We construct this index using measures from the
International Country Risk Guide, which evaluates a country’s risk for international investment
by looking at its social and political situation. Specifically, we average the values of indicators
measuring the absence of corruption in the political system, the prevalence of law and order, and
the level of democratic accountability.15
1.3 Regulation and macroeconomic performance
Having described how the regulatory environment varies across countries, our objective for
this section is examining whether regulations have an impact on macroeconomic performance.
Regulations are imposed for a variety of reasons. Officially, they are enacted to serve specific
15See Appendix A for a more detailed description of these components.
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social purposes, from consumer health safety to the protection of domestic employment. In reality,
however, the imposition of regulation follows a more complex political economy process, where
legitimate social goals are mixed with the objectives of particular interest groups (see Djankov,
La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002). Whatever their justifications and objectives, reg-
ulations are likely to have an impact beyond their area of control. Here we examine whether they
have an aggregate effect, specifically on economic growth and volatility. Together these variables
provide a comprehensive, yet succinct, evaluation of macroeconomic performance.
In assessing the effect of the regulatory environment, it is important to consider that the
quality of regulation is profoundly affected by the institutional context in which it is imposed.
Thus, the ultimate impact that regulation may have on macroeconomic performance is likely to
be affected by the country’s level of institutional development. In order to explore the interaction
between institutional progress and regulatory environment, we extend the basic empirical analysis
by allowing the effect of regulation to vary with a measure of governance.
Our empirical analysis also considers the likely endogeneity of the regulatory environment.
In particular, economic growth and volatility may shape to some extent the type and strength
of regulation imposed in a country. For instance, governments of economies subject to external
shocks and associated volatility may want to impose labor constraints in an attempt to protect
domestic employment. Also, stagnant economic growth may prompt governments to increase
public infrastructure spending, having to finance it with a heavier fiscal burden. Although the
regulatory environment is likely to be affected by macroeconomic performance, it is not clear in
what direction and to what extent. In order to identify the effect of regulation on macroeconomic
performance, we use instrumental variables that isolate the exogenous variation in regulation.
1.3.1 Sample and specification
Our empirical methodology is based on cross-country regression analysis. We conduct sep-
arate regressions for each dependent variable of interest, namely, economic growth and macroeco-
nomic volatility. In each case, we use as explanatory variables a measure of regulation and a set
14
of basic control variables. All variables included in the empirical exercises are briefly presented
below, except the regulation indices that were introduced in the previous section.
Our sample consists of 74 - 76 countries, depending on the regression exercise. In the largest
sample, we have 22 developed and 54 developing countries, of which 21 belong to Latin America, 23
to Africa and the Middle East, and 10 to Asia. Country observations for each variable correspond
to averages for the 1990s. We are constrained to this decade because internationally comparable
regulation measures are available only for this period.
The dependent variables are defined as follows. As is standard in the literature, economic
growth is measured as the average annual rate of per capita real GDP growth. Macroeconomic
volatility is represented by the standard deviation of the output gap, obtained as the difference
between actual and trend per capita real GDP. Trend output is estimated using the band-pass
filter of Baxter and King (1999).
As described in the previous section, our explanatory variables of interest are indices that
quantify a country’s regulatory burden. We consider, in turn, the overall regulation index and its
three main components, that is, the product market, labor, and fiscal regulation indices. In an
extension to the basic specification, we interact the regulation index with a governance proxy, which
as already noted is constructed from information on experts’ perceptions on public accountability,
absence of corruption, and rule of law, as reported by the International Country Risk Guide.16
The instrumental variables, used to isolate the exogenous variation in the regulation indices,
are selected considering the recent literature on the determinants of the regulatory environment
(see Djankov et al., 2004 and Bolaky and Freund, 2004). They are the initial level of per capita
GDP, binary variables that denote legal origin (British, French, German, and Nordic), and proxies
for the degree of Western influence based on the fraction of the population that speaks a major
European language.17
16We don’t include governance as a separate explanatory variable because it is highly collinear with the governance-
regulation interaction term. If we did it, we would find that neither governance per se nor interacted with regulation
is statistically significant.
17An alternative instrument for the latter would be a dummy variable taking a value equal to one if the country
has a colonial past; while this would be more in line with the growth regressions literature, it would not allow for
varying degrees of influence by an external culture. Nevertheless it would be worthwhile to replace this instrument
as a robustness check.
15
Finally, the set of control variables for the growth regressions consists of the initial level of
per capita real GDP (to account for convergence effects), the initial rate of secondary enrollment
(as proxy for human capital investment), the initial ratio of private domestic credit to GDP (to
account for financial depth), and a Sub-Saharan dummy variable that controls for the particular
conditions of civil conflict, mismanagement, and disease affecting this region, and that cannot be
captured by initial GDP alone.18
The set of control variables for the volatility regressions represent the major causes of
macroeconomic fluctuations, as identified in the literature. They are the standard deviation of
terms of trade shocks, a measure of real exchange rate overvaluation, and the frequency of systemic
banking crisis.
1.3.2 Results and discussion
By way of illustration, Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show scatter plots that represent the simple
relationship between the regulation indices and, respectively, economic growth and macroeconomic
volatility. The graphs using overall regulation consistently suggest that more heavily regulated
economies tend to experience lower economic growth and higher volatility. Observations reflecting
poor macroeconomic performance and high overall regulatory burden belong mostly to developing
countries, while developed economies tend to occupy the other end of the distribution. The negative
link between macroeconomic performance and overall regulation seems to be driven by product
market regulation and, to a lesser extent, labor regulation. On the other hand, the connection with
the fiscal burden appears to go in the opposite direction, so that fiscally more regulated economies
show slightly better performance, although the association is not very strong.
18The “Africa dummy” has a long tradition in empirical growth studies; see for example Easterly and Levine
(1997). We believe it is important to account for the particular conditions of the African continent when we look at
regulation, so as to avoid overstating the effect of regulation on macroeconomic aggregates. Indeed, removing the
dummy increases the magnitude of the regulation coefficients, particularly the “product market” index; at the same
time, when we include the dummy our regulation coefficients are still statistically and economically significant.
16
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Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
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A more formal evaluation of the link between the regulation indices and the measures of
macroeconomic performance requires multiple regression analysis, to which we turn now. The
regression results are organized as follows. We first present the results of a basic specification
where the regulation indices are taken as independent variables and their effects as unrelated to
governance.
Then, we allow for the effects of regulation on macro performance to vary with the quality
of governance. Finally, keeping the regulation-governance interaction, we further control for the
likely endogeneity of the regulation indices through an instrumental variable procedure.
Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 present the basic specification results on economic growth and
macroeconomic volatility, respectively. The overall index of regulation has a negative and signifi-
cant association with economic growth, and so do the product market and labor regulation indices.
The index of fiscal burden has no significant link with economic growth. The results on macroeco-
nomic volatility are similar for overall and product market regulation: both are positively related
to volatility. Conversely, labor regulation has no significant link with macroeconomic volatility,
and a heavier fiscal burden even appears to be related to lower volatility. Whereas some of these
initial results are strengthened in the richer regression specifications discussed next, others change
radically -such is the case of the negative connection between the fiscal burden and macroeconomic
volatility.
Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 present the estimation results when we allow for the effect of
regulation on growth and volatility to vary with the quality of governance. In the case of economic
growth, the overall, product market, and labor regulation indices all carry significantly negative
signs and their interaction terms with governance show a positive and significant coefficient.
Thus, the negative association of these regulation indices with economic growth appears to
be mitigated when the quality of governance rises. Indeed, the point estimates seem to suggest
that at the theoretical maximum level of governance quality (equal to one) the impact of product
market and labor regulation could even turn positive; however, the test results reported in the last
row of Tables 1.5 and 1.6 cannot reject the hypothesis that under such optimal governance the
18
impact of regulation is nil.19
A potential problem of including governance as a control for the institutional quality of the
country is that there is a high (negative) correlation between the governance index and the product
market regulation index. It is possible indeed that macroeconomic performance really depends on
institutional quality, and not on regulation, but the correlation between the two causes the effect
of regulation to appear as significant. To test for this possibility, we ran regressions with the
corresponding regulation index and governance as a control, but no interaction term. We find that
in the case of product market regulation, the coefficient of regulation is still negative and significant,
while the coefficient of governance is insignificant, and we find the opposite results for the labor
market and fiscal regulation indices, that is, the regulation index coefficient is insignificant, while
the governance coefficient is positive and significant. Thus, introducing governance as a control
does not alter our results from the basic specification, which indicates that regulation indeed has
explanatory power beyond its correlation with governance.
As for the fiscal burden, neither its direct coefficient nor the coefficient on the interaction
term is statistically significant in the growth regression. The results on macroeconomic volatility
are broadly similar. The overall, product market, and labor regulation indices carry positive and
significant coefficients and their corresponding interaction terms with governance have negative
signs, which are significant for overall and labor regulation. Again, this evidence is suggestive that
good governance moderates the association between heavier regulation and larger volatility.
As before, the fiscal burden appears to behave differently from other regulations: Only the
interaction term is significant, indicating as before that when the quality of governance is high,
heavier fiscal regulation is related to lower volatility.
19Note that the impact of regulation under the highest level of governance quality is given by the sum of the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 report the results when we both allow for the governance-regulation
interaction and control for the likely endogeneity of the regulation indices. Given that now reverse
causation is controlled for, the interpretation of the regression coefficients goes beyond the mere
association between regulation and the indices of macroeconomic performance. The coefficients
can now be interpreted as effects of changes in the regulation indices on economic growth and
macroeconomic volatility. All regulation indices show a direct negative impact on economic growth,
and this impact is statistically significant for all except fiscal regulation. The governance-regulation
interaction term carries a significantly positive coefficient in all cases. Therefore, for overall,
product market, and labor regulation, we find that a larger regulatory burden brings about a
decrease in growth, but such effect is mitigated by better quality of governance. In the case of
fiscal regulation, the estimates are less precise but suggest a potentially beneficial impact on growth
that drops when the quality of governance quality decreases. Regarding macroeconomic volatility,
the direct coefficients on all regulation indices are positive and significant, including the elusive one
on fiscal regulation. The interaction term carries a negative coefficient for all regulation indices,
but it is significantly so only in the cases of labor and fiscal regulations.
Taken together, this means that a heavier burden of overall, product market, labor or fiscal
regulation leads to higher macroeconomic volatility, and this harmful effect is mitigated by better










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































One potential concern with these results is their sensitivity to outlying observations. Fig-
ures 1.3 and 1.4 suggest that some countries, such as Sierra Leone, are atypical and may be having
an unduly large influence on the estimated parameters. To discard the possibility that our results
are driven by outliers, we rerun the regressions with the most complete specification for growth
and volatility (as in Tables 1.7 and 1.8) but excluding clearly atypical cases. We use Cook’s D ratio
as the criterion for exclusion of outliers. Specifically, we exclude the countries whose Cook’s ratio
consistently exceeds the threshold of 0.1 in our basic regressions.20 This threshold turns out to be
the value below which the influence of the vast majority of countries on the estimated parameters
becomes very similar to each other (see Cook, 1979 and Fox, 1997). For growth regressions, the
potential outliers are Burkina Faso, Nicaragua, and Sierra Leone; and for volatility regressions,
they are Nigeria and Sierra Leone. We find that the regressions results without potential outliers
are quite similar to the regressions with the original sample.21 The coefficient signs remain the
same. The magnitude of the coefficients change slightly, usually in the direction of somewhat
smaller regulation effects, but their statistical significance improves as they are estimated more
precisely. Given that excluding potential outliers does not change the results in any relevant way,
we conduct the rest of the analysis using the parameters obtained with the original sample.
How important are the regulation effects economically? Using the point estimates of the
regression that accounts for governance interactions and controls for joint endogeneity, we can
perform some illustrative exercises. If a country’s overall index of regulation was increased by
one standard deviation in the cross-country sample (0.13) and its level of governance is equal to
the world median (0.44), then its annual rate of per capita GDP growth would decrease by 0.4
percentage points. If a typical developing country were to decrease its product market regulation
to the median level of industrial countries (that is, from 0.51 to 0.17) while maintaining its level of
governance (equal to the median of developing countries, 0.37), then its annual growth rate would
20Cook’s D ratio measures the change in the regression estimates that results from eliminating one observation from
the sample. A large value of the ratio attributed to one observation indicates that eliminating the observation from
the regression significantly changes the results. The usual reference threshold to determine whether an observation
has high influence is 4/N . We identify the outliers by applying the Cook’s ratio criterion to the OLS regressions
only, in accordance with theory. However, once the non-outlier sample is selected, we use it for estimation via
instrumental variables.
21The results on the sample without potential outliers are not presented here but are available upon request.
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rise by about 1.3 percentage points. The point estimates of the coefficients are such that if the
quality of governance is sufficiently high, an increase in regulation can have a positive impact on
growth. 22For overall, product market, and labor regulations, this threshold level is quite high,
comparable approximately to the quality of governance in the United States or England. Regarding
fiscal regulation, the threshold above which an increase in the fiscal burden can have a positive
growth impact is smaller and comparable to that of Mexico.
We can perform similar exercises regarding regulation’s impact on macroeconomic volatility.
If a typical (or median) country in the world experiences a one-standard-deviation increase in the
overall index of regulation, its volatility will rise by about 18%. If a typical developing country
were to decrease its product market regulation to the median level of industrial countries, its
volatility would fall by about 31%. These calculations use the point estimates of the coefficient
on the interaction term, even though they are not statistically significant at standard levels for
the overall and product market regulation indices. If we were to assume a zero coefficient on
the governance-regulation interaction term, the corresponding effects would be considerably larger
(0.28% and 0.49%, respectively). For labor regulation, the threshold level of governance above
which higher regulation decreases volatility is around the 70th percentile, comparable to that of
Korea. For fiscal regulation, the volatility-increasing effect would disappear only under a perfect
governance score.
1.4 Conclusion
Regulation is increasingly viewed as a key explanatory factor for the diversity of aggregate
economic performance across countries. In this Chapter we have provided an empirical assessment
of the macroeconomic impact of regulation in a large sample of industrial and developing economies.
For this purpose, we have built a set of synthetic regulation indicators encompassing a broad array
of regulatory dimensions relevant to firms’ economic activity: firm entry, labor, taxation, trade,
finance, contract enforcement, and bankruptcy.
22As noted above, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the impact of regulation on growth (or volatility,
for that matter) is statistically zero when governance is at its maximum (see the test results presented in the last
row of Tables 1.7 and 1.8).
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These synthetic regulation indicators allow us to characterize the stylized facts concerning
regulation around the world. Two main findings emerge in this regard. First, the burden of
regulation shows considerable variation across countries, but in ways that appear systematically
related to countries’ level of development. Taxes are most heavily regulated in rich countries, while
in all other areas developing countries show the harshest regulatory environments. Second, the
overall regulatory framework can be conveniently summarized by the extent of regulation in three
major dimensions: fiscal, labor and output market, where the latter encompasses the regulation of
entry, trade, financial markets, bankruptcy and contract enforcement.
Using this summary representation of the regulatory environment, we have assessed empir-
ically the impact of regulation on two key measures of aggregate performance, namely the growth
rate of GDP per capita and the volatility of the output gap. Our estimations take into account
the fact that the quality of regulation is likely to vary considerably across countries, reflecting
primarily the quality of their overall institutional framework. In addition, we also control for the
potential endogeneity of regulation, which could itself be driven in part by aggregate economic
performance. This allows us to interpret our empirical results as reflecting the causal impact of
regulation on the macroeconomic variables of interest, rather than just mere association between
the former and the latter.
On the whole, our estimates suggest that regulation tends to reduce growth. This is clearly
the case for product and labor market regulation. In the case of fiscal regulation, however, the
results are less conclusive. Regarding macroeconomic volatility, our finding is that all three kinds
of regulation tend to increase it. However, the quality of regulation -as captured by the overall
institutional framework– makes a big difference. In most instances we find that better institutions
help mitigate, and even eliminate, the adverse impact of regulation on macroeconomic performance.
Does the negative macroeconomic effect of regulations imply that they should be eliminated
altogether? As warned in the introduction, this Chapter does not intend to assess the impact of
regulation on social goals that could arguably be beyond the sphere of direct influence of economic
growth -broad goals such as social equity and peace, or narrow ones such as worker safety, environ-
29
mental conservation, and civil security– which typically motivate specific regulations. Thus, our
conclusions on the role of regulation must necessarily be weighed in a more comprehensive context
before drawing definitive social welfare implications. At any rate, to the extent that economic
growth and macroeconomic stability are important goals too, our findings imply that streamlin-
ing regulation and strengthening governance in highly regulated countries could have a significant
payoff in terms of macroeconomic performance.
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Chapter 2
Regulation and Microeconomic Dynamics: A Comparative Assessment for Latin
America
2.1 Introduction
The effects of microeconomic regulation on aggregate economic performance have recently
attracted renewed attention in the policy debate. Intricate regulation and its arbitrary enforcement
are listed by the World Bank (2005) among the key obstacles to growth in developing countries,
while excessive regulation has been likewise blamed by many observers for Europe’s lagging per-
formance vis-à-vis the U.S.
Some recent empirical studies have been concerned with the impact of regulation and dereg-
ulation on aggregate growth in a cross-country setting. Koedijk and Kremers (1996) find a negative
association between measures of product market regulation and GDP growth among 11 European
countries. In contrast, they find that labor regulations have no significant association with growth
performance. Dutz and Hairy (1999) apply extreme-bounds analysis to estimate the contribution
to growth of a variety of (mostly subjective) regulation and competition indicators in a sample
of industrial and developing countries. They find significant effects of measures of anti-trust pol-
icy and the average age of large firms (taken as proxy for entry and exit barriers). In contrast,
Card and Freeman (2002) fail to find any significant association between subjective measures of
economic regulation and growth performance in a panel regression covering OECD countries over
1970-99.
Chapter 1 of this thesis explores the growth impact of synthetic indicators of product market,
labor market and fiscal regulation, using a large cross-country sample. On the whole, results show
that product market and labor regulation unambiguously deter per capita income growth, while
for fiscal regulation the findings are more mixed. Furthermore, the adverse growth impact of
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regulation is exacerbated under conditions of poor governance.
While these studies summarize the empirical relation between regulation and growth perfor-
mance, they are not directly informative about the mechanisms at work. Conceptually, there are
several channels through which regulation may affect aggregate performance (see, e.g., Griffith and
Harrison, 2004). First, regulation affects the allocation of resources across firms and sectors with
different productivity levels, thus impacting on overall efficiency. Second, regulation also affects
the level of productivity of existing firms, by changing their incentives to reduce slack and utilize
factors more or less intensely. And third, regulation also has an impact on firms’ incentives to
innovate and introduce new products and processes, and hence on the pace of expansion of the
technological frontier.
The analytical literature has devoted particular attention to the allocative mechanism -the
Schumpeterian process of external restructuring whereby market selection reallocates resources
from low-efficiency to high-efficiency firms, through contraction and exit of the former, and ex-
pansion and new entry by the latter. Regulatory barriers that disrupt this “creative destruction”
process cause a deterioration in aggregate economic performance, by allowing low-productivity
activities to survive too long, and discouraging the adoption of new high-productivity activities
(Caballero and Hammour, 1998).
In turn, the theoretical literature offers conflicting predictions regarding the effect of dereg-
ulation on the incentives to innovate. On the one hand, the reduction in rents resulting from
increased market contestability may discourage the introduction of new products and processes.
On the other hand, incumbent firms may face an increased incentive to innovate in order to escape
the pressure of competition (Aghion et al., 2001). Thus, the net effect of regulation on innovation
is ambiguous on conceptual grounds, and can be determined only empirically.
This Chapter assesses empirically the role of firm dynamics as the mechanism linking reg-
ulation and growth -specifically, the growth rate of output per worker– using both aggregate and
sector-wise manufacturing data for a set of OECD and Latin American countries. The analysis
follows a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we assess the empirical link between regulation
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and firm turnover. We employ both overall manufacturing data as well as sector-level data on firm
entry and exit rates. In the second stage, we relate growth in output per worker to firm turnover
using overall manufacturing data. This is done using both OLS regressions as well as instrumental-
variable regressions with regulatory indices as instruments for firm turnover, to isolate the variation
in the latter due to regulation. Such procedure allows us to assess if firm dynamics provides the
link between regulation and productivity performance, as predicted by the “creative destruction”
view.
This chapter relates closely to other recent attempts to shed light on the link between
regulation and aggregate performance. Griffith and Harrison (2004) follow a similar two-step
approach to study product-market regulatory reform, but rather than firm turnover they stress
instead the role of markup variations. Their implicit assumption is that regulatory reforms impact
on performance only through their effect on the degree of competition among firms, as captured
by markup levels. Their empirical tests, using data from OECD countries, yield mixed results:
decreased regulation does lead to lower markups, but these in turn seem to be associated with
lower, rather than higher, levels and growth rates of productivity and R&D effort. Moreover, in
many cases they find that regulatory variables appear to have an independent effect on aggregate
performance, above and beyond the effect occurring through the markup. Other papers focus
instead on the Schumpeterian mechanism of firm entry and exit –like we do here. Klapper, Laeven
and Rajan (2004) assess the effects of regulation on firm entry using firm-level data for developed
and transition European countries. On the whole, they find that regulation deters entry, and also
hampers industry-level productivity growth. Cincera and Galgau (2005) are likewise concerned
with firm entry and exit, and take a two-step approach similar to ours. They asses the impact
of (subjective) product-market regulation measures on entry and exit rates by sector in 9 OECD
countries, and examine also the effect of entry and exit on sector-wise productivity. On the whole,
their results indicate that product market deregulation increases entry and exit rates, while these
in turn have a (weakly) positive impact on the growth of output and labor productivity.
Our Chapter expands this literature in several dimensions. First, unlike most previous
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studies, which have focused on selected OECD economies, we consider both industrial and Latin
American countries. Second, rather than confining the analysis to product-market regulation alone,
which is the concern of the recent literature, we consider three different kinds of regulations -those
affecting the product market, those affecting the labor market, and fiscal regulations. Third, we
distinguish among the various components of observed productivity growth -i.e., those due to
entry, exit, reallocation among incumbent firms, and productivity growth within incumbent firms–
to assess if they are affected in different ways by regulation.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of firm
dynamics and productivity growth in Latin America and a sample of industrial countries. Section
3 discusses differences in regulation across countries, with particular attention to Latin America.
In section 4, we lay out the main questions we explore and our estimation strategy, and present
results. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Microeconomic dynamics in Latin America
The starting point of our analysis is the harmonized data set constructed by Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004) that covers 24 industrialized, developing, and transition coun-
tries. The data set provides demographics and productivity data for manufacturing, such as the
number (and total employment) of entrants, continuers, and exiting firms by (ISIC 3-digit) in-
dustry, size class, and year. It also reports the 5-year labor productivity average growth rate by
industry and year, together with the contribution to labor productivity growth of entering, contin-
uing, and exiting firms computed following Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2000), and Griliches
and Regev (1995). We select all Latin American countries available in the data set, and compare
them to industrial economies.1 Our basic working sample consists of the following countries:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Finland, France, The Netherlands, the UK, and
the US.
1We refer the reader to Bartelsman et al. (2004) for a detailed description of the data collection protocol, as well
as important discussions of the main indicators constructed.
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2.2.1 Firm entry, exit, and turnover
Numerous studies have documented evidence of heterogeneity across firms as well as inten-
sive reallocation of resources across firms in industrial countries (see for instance, Dunne et al.,
1989, Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). All find that in the US and Europe the reallocation pace is
high, for instance, Bartelsman et al. (2003) report that, on average, close to 20 percent of firms en-
ter and exit the market every year in ten OECD countries. In addition, productivity varies greatly
across firms, even within narrowly-defined industries (see Foster et al., 2001). More recently, a few
studies have looked at firm dynamics in developing countries and have found, perhaps surprisingly,
that reallocation and productivity dynamics are in fact similar to that in industrial countries (see,
for instance, Roberts and Tybout, 1996).
Panel (a) of Figure 2.1 depicts the employment-weighted firm turnover rates for manufac-
turing in Latin America and industrial countries over the 1991-2001 period.2 It is calculated as
the sum of employment at entering and exiting firms divided by total employment in the current
year.
From the first panel in the figure, it is evident that turnover rates are very similar in Latin
America and the sample of industrial countries, with the exception of the US, where turnover is
considerably higher.3 All other countries have turnover rates between 10 and 20 percent. The
case is similar for entry and exit rates.All other countries have turnover rates between 10 and 20
percent. The case is similar for entry and exit rates.
Several questions arise upon looking at this figure: first, are these “natural” turnover rates?
Almost surely, the answer is “no.” Indeed, our data covers in the best case the entire 1990s decade,
but for Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and several industrial countries we have data only for the
second half of the decade, and in some cases less than five years. Therefore, it is reasonable to
believe that much of the movement of firms we observe is related to the cycle in each country.
The second question is then: does this movement accurately reflect responses to shocks? A
2Notice that employment-weighted firm turnover only takes into account job creation and job coming from the
entry and exit of firms, and hence is not equal to the well-known “job reallocation” measure, which also takes into
account job flows across continuing firms.
3Mexico, excluded from the sample because of lack of productivity data, has one of the highest turnover rates of
the entire sample, along with the US.
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Employment!weighted turnover in manufacturing divided by volatility of TOT growth
Firm Turnover in Latin America and Industrial Countries
(b)
Sources: Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2005), and authors’ calculations
simple way to measure aggregate shocks is to look at the volatility of terms of trade growth. We
use the standard deviation of the growth rate of terms of trade as a proxy for the volatility of the
economy, which in turn is an indication of the frequency of the shocks that hit the economy. We
prefer this measure to the volatility of, say, per capita GDP growth because, assuming that firms
are price takers, shocks to terms of trade represent exogenous shocks to industries and hence are
less likely to be affected by firms’ dynamics.4 As it turns out, Latin American countries exhibit
much greater volatility of terms-of-trade growth than industrial countries, and industrial countries
4This addresses the debate about whether there is a feedback effect from reallocation to the business cycle. See
Schuh and Triest (1998).
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with high volatility of terms-of-trade growth also exhibit larger rates of entry, exit, and turnover of
firms than other countries. In fact, simply dividing entry, exit, and turnover rates by this measure
of volatility gives a completely different picture about firm dynamics: panel (b) in Figure 2.1 shows
that, under this corrected measure, firm dynamics in Latin America are much lower than in most
countries in the industrial sample. This picture gives us some preliminary evidence that, indeed,
much of the movement of firms in and out of the market occurs as a response to macroeconomic
shocks.
Third, we can ask ourselves whether the magnitude of the response in each country cor-
responds to an efficient scenario. To understand this, we need to look at the counterfactual of
what would happen in the absence of barriers to adjustment, such as excessive entry, exit, or labor
regulations. Again, by a simple examination of this picture it is reasonable to conjecture that
adjustment in Latin America is far from efficient: indeed, given the magnitude of the shocks that
hit these countries, adjustment should be much larger in order to obtain “corrected” measures that
look similar to those in industrial countries.
2.2.2 Labor productivity growth
A natural question that arises from observing firm dynamics concerns the implications of
having a more or less rapid turnover of firms on productivity gains at the firm and industry level.
Indeed, a large number firms leaving and entering the market each year is not per se a desirable
outcome; it only becomes so if, as a result of this process, the firms that stay in the market
experience productivity gains, if not in the short run, at least in the medium to long term.5
Figure 2.2.2 presents the productivity growth decomposition for Finland, France, the UK,
the Netherlands, the US, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Venezuela. As in Griliches and
Regev (1995), the decomposition of labor productivity growth between years t− k and t (k = 5 in
5According to theoretical explanations of the negative correlation between job reallocation and the business cycle,
the job destruction that takes place during recessions is not entirely “creative destruction.” In fact, in the presence
of frictions, destruction can be highly inefficient (as in Caballero and Hammour, 1998, or Ouyang, 2004). However,
we expect that in the long run, a relatively frictionless economy will experience productivity gains coming from the
entry and exit of firms, a fact that has been documented for several industrial countries by Foster et al. (2001),
Barnes et al. (2001), and others. In addition, an economy that undergoes a liberalization process by tearing down
burdensome regulation should indeed experience productivity gains from inefficient firms losing ground to efficient
ones.
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where P is productivity at the industry level, pi is productivity at the firm level, and θi is the
share of firm i in the industry (in terms of output). The first term in the decomposition represents
the “within contribution” to productivity growth, that is, the amount of productivity growth
coming from productivity increments within continuing firms; the second term is the “between”
contribution, or the addition to productivity coming from reallocation of resources between firms;
and the two last terms represent the portion of productivity growth coming from the entry and exit
of firms in the industry. The upper bar over each variable represents the average value between
the base and end years.
Since we are mostly interested in knowing whether regulation affects gains in productivity
within firms or gains in productivity coming from the creative destruction process, we also look at
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= within + reallocation
Panel A of Figure 2.2.2 depicts the total growth of labor productivity and the contribution
of incumbents that experience productivity gains (within), expand or contract (between), and
the contribution of entrants minus exiting firms (net entry). To make our comparisons more
meaningful, we use the average annual labor productivity growth rates over the relevant 5−year
periods, instead of the 5-year growth rates. As in the case of firm dynamics, we can see here that
the productivity picture is quite similar for Latin America and the industrial sample, or at least,
there is no clear pattern that differentiates one group from another. For instance, Argentina and
Colombia have experienced higher productivity gains than the US, the UK, the Netherlands, and
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France. However, we should note again that the time coverage of the data is quite limited, so that
the numbers for each country are not comparable, if only for the different years they cover.6
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6For instance, Brazil has data for only 2001, while Chile and Colombia have over ten years; moreover, the time







Note: the productivity decomposition showed is calculated following Griliches and Regev (1995). Labor productivity
is a weighted average of firm productivity (weighted using value added), and the growth rate shown in the graphs
corresponds to an average annual growth rate, based on the 5-year growth rate.
While attempting to draw any conclusions from a simple visual analysis of the data would
be futile, a more serious econometric analysis is subject to important caveats as well, in particular
relating to the use of labor productivity measures in lieu of more accurate measures of productivity,
such as TFP. Labor productivity measures are sensitive not only to technological change, but also
to temporary changes in utilization in response to shocks (see, for instance, Basu, Fernald and
Kimball, 1998), especially in the presence of adjustment costs. This should be the case particularly
in countries where barriers to adjustment add to the natural adjustment costs. Demand shocks are
also likely to alter measured labor productivity, even in the absence of changes in TFP. Clearly,
for our purposes, it would be preferable to use TFP, however, in the absence of such data our
approach is to measure the long term effects that regulation has on labor productivity growth,
either coming from a reduced pace of technological progress or from distortions to adjustment.
Similar to the turnover case, we try to understand to what extent the observed changes in
productivity correspond to adjustment to temporary shocks unrelated to technological progress.
With this purpose in mind, we look at the average growth of terms of trade during the period in
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which productivity changes were measured (5 years). This measure is more appropriate than the
standard deviation of terms of trade growth because we want to capture the direction of the shock,
not just the magnitude. A large negative shock may cause a drop in labor productivity growth; in
the absence of such shock, productivity growth may have been positive and high.
Panel B of Figure 2.2.2 shows changes in labor productivity and the average growth of
terms of trade during the same period. It is clear from the picture that changes in terms of trade
in Latin America are far larger than in industrial countries. However, if we use this measure of
shocks to “correct” productivity growth, we could see that a large portion of the changes in labor
productivity growth cannot be explained as a pure response to these temporary shocks.
From these preliminary observations, we outline two main empirical questions: first, are
firm movements in and out of the market related to the observed labor productivity gains (or
losses)? Second, how much do differences in regulation explain of the differences in turnover and,
ultimately, labor productivity gains? These are the main questions we address in Section 4.
2.3 Business regulation and reform in Latin America
2.3.1 Cross-country differences in regulation
To begin our assessment of regulation in Latin America, we make a static comparison of
the severity of business regulation our sample countries. We use the indices presented in Chapter
1, which combine de jure and de facto measures of regulation, thus accounting for the practical
restrictions and complications brought about by certain rules. Each index measures the intensity
of the regulatory system on a scale from 0 to 1 (1 representing the highest regulation) in seven
areas: entry, financial markets, trade, labor, difficulty in contract enforcement, bankruptcy, and
fiscal burden. Because all measures used in the construction of these indices refer to the late 1990s,
this initial comparison as useful starting point: it allows us to see where Latin America stands
today vis-à-vis industrial countries in terms of regulation. Given that many countries (including,
Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia) underwent large reform processes in the early 1990s, this is a
useful evaluation of how far reforms have reached so far.
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Indices take values from 0 to 1, 1 representing the most stringent regulation (and best governance). See Chapter 1
and Appendix A for more details.
Panels A-C in Figure 2.3 present each index by country and region. The product market
regulation index is the simple average of the entry, financial, contract, trade, and bankruptcy
regulation indices, which typically consist of sub-indices that reflect the number of days, the
number of procedures, and the cost of opening or closing a business, for example. The index
of labor regulation combines the percentage of workers that belong to a union, the minimum
mandatory working conditions, and the degree of hiring and firing flexibility granted by the law.
The index of fiscal burden measures direct taxation -that is, the maximum tax rate applied to
individuals and businesses– and fiscal spending. Except for the financial markets regulation index
and the fiscal burden index, the correlation between the indices is positive and significant, and
large (over 0.5), suggesting that countries that regulate heavily do so in various areas. For each
index, the average score from the industrial sample is significantly lower than the average score
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of the Latin American sample. For instance, the index of entry regulation in Latin America is
0.41 and while it is 0.24 in the industrial sample; likewise, the difficulty of contract enforcement
index is 0.26 in the industrial sample and 0.57 in Latin America, and the index of bankruptcy
regulation is 0.25 in the industrial sample and 0.49 in Latin America. Labor market regulation
varies considerably across both samples of countries. The US and the UK reach the lowest scores
(0.3 and 0.35), while the most stringent labor market regulation is in Brazil (0.75) followed by
Venezuela (0.7). But some Latin American countries also display more flexible labor regulations
than industrial countries, for instance Chile (0.5) and Colombia (0.57) have less stringent labor
regulation than Finland (0.58).7
Given the current debate about the need for more flexible labor markets in developing
economies, it is important to point out to the fact that, first, several developing countries have
introduced substantial reforms, and second, labor markets present rigidities in developed countries
as well. Although most studies tend to agree on the fact that reform is beneficial and rigidity is
costly, the cross-country heterogeneity observed in firm dynamics and productivity suggests that
more research needs to be done in order to assess the total cost of stringent labor market regulation
on one hand, and the effects of reform on the other, in particular when reforms are not carried out
on different dimensions of regulation.
The fiscal burden in industrial countries not only scores worse on average than in Latin
American countries (0.65 versus 0.6); even the country with the best score in the industrial sample,
the United States (0.62), stands below all Latin American countries but Brazil (0.62). Argentina,
Chile, and Venezuela have the lowest scores (0.59), and Finland, France, and the Netherlands have
the highest (0.66).
2.4 Regulation and microeconomic dynamics in Latin America
Having described how the regulatory environment varies across countries, our objective for
this section is examining whether regulations have an impact on firm dynamics and ultimately on
7Further, other countries excluded from the sample, like Italy and Portugal, have even higher labor regulation
scores than Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and El Salvador.
43
productivity growth performance. Our main question is: is firm dynamics the channel through
which regulation affects labor productivity growth? In order to answer this question, we need to,
first link regulation to firm dynamics; second, link firm dynamics to labor productivity growth
rates, and finally, establish whether the effect of firm dynamics on labor productivity growth is
explained by the component of firm dynamics due to business regulation flexibility (for which we use
an instrumental variable procedure). In exploring the link between regulation and firm dynamics,
we also look at the role of firm dynamics in the adjustment from macroeconomic shocks, and how
it is affected in the presence of more or less flexible regulation.
2.4.1 Sample and specification
Our empirical methodology is based on panel regression analysis. We conduct separate
regressions for each dependent variable of interest, namely, turnover rate, growth rate of labor
productivity, and each of its components. We use as explanatory variables a measure of regulation
and a set of basic control variables. All variables included in the empirical exercises are briefly
presented below, except the regulation indices that were introduced in the previous section.
A further complication arises in the analysis from the fact that there is a large amount of
heterogeneity across in firm dynamics and productivity, even within narrowly defined sectors. We
deal with this by conducting regressions at several levels of aggregation, and introducing fixed
effects for each category. The regression equations are presented below.
Our sample consists of the 10 countries mentioned before: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Finland, France, the Netherlands, the UK, the US, and Venezuela. All observations for each
variable correspond to the period 1990−2001 for firm demographics and 1988−2001 for productiv-
ity, although our panel is unbalanced, so that for some countries the time variation is more limited.
We voluntarily ignore observations before the late 1980s, as most internationally comparable reg-
ulation measures are available only for the 1990s and therefore including data for a much earlier
period based on regulation data could be misleading. This is particularly the case for countries
that carried out regulatory reforms during the 1908s and early 1990s, as many Latina American
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countries did.
Within each country-year category, we observe employment-weighted turnover rates, and
labor productivity growth and its components for 22 stan-0 industries, that is, we observe the
contribution to productivity growth coming from “within,” “between,” and “net entry” in each
country. As Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2005) note, data were collected using a
unified protocol, so that cross-country comparisons are less subject to measurement errors than
previously available data. However, the availability of data is not uniform, so that in some countries
data are provided at the firm level (e.g., in Finland, France, Italy, and Venezuela) and others at the
establishment/plant level. The same is true for size classes: in most countries, there is a cutoff size
for registering an establishment or firm (usually a minimum of one employee), but other countries,
like France, establish a minimum revenue level. While we cannot exclude biases arising from this
sample selection problem, we believe our sample to be “sufficient” in the sense that most of the
components of our regulation indices typically refer to a “small to medium-size” business (between
10 and 100 employees), and therefore very few of the excluded firms are in fact relevant for our
analysis.
Before laying out our estimation strategy, it is important to look at the predictions of
the theory with respect to the impact of various regulations on firms dynamics and productivity.
Industry evolution models with heterogeneous agents, such as Hopenhayn (1992), analyze the
effect of different regulations on the entry and exit decision of firms, and on the resulting industry
productivity distribution. For instance, and increase in entry costs reduces firm turnover, as fewer
potential entrants have a present discounted value of entering high enough to cover the entry cost.
At the same time, incumbent firms need to stay longer in the market in order to recover the entry
cost. Chapter 3 of this thesis shows a similar effect on turnover of increasing exit costs. Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993) show that introducing firing costs reduces firm turnover because it delays the
destruction of jobs (and thus firm exit). Micco and Pagés (2004) show that the magnitude of
the adjustment of labor (i.e. worker turnover) depends on the size of the aggregate shock faced
by the sector, so that adjustment costs will have a greater impact on adjustment in sectors that
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“naturally” suffer shocks of larger magnitude.
Increases in regulation that affect the cost of innovation have ambiguous effects on turnover.
Chapter 3 of this thesis finds that increases in the cost of “active learning” (reflecting R&D
expenditures, but also more general investments, such as technology adoption), actually increase
turnover, as the share of incumbent firms that forego innovation grows, which forces them to leave
the industry sooner. Comin and Mulani (2005) distinguish in their model between technology
adoption and R&D, and their results suggest that regulations affecting R&D might encourage firms
to invest more in adopting general innovations, and because R&D drives volatility of productivity
growth at the firm level, a reduction in R&D spending should reflect in a decrease of firm level
volatility, although not necessarily in aggregate volatility. This decrease in R&D spending will also
decrease market turnover, measured as the rate at which the leader in the industry changes.
More generally, the size of adjustment (in terms of workers or firms) in each sector depends
on the size of the shocks that affect that sector. A sector with more volatile shocks will tend to
have also a more volatile adjustment pattern than a sector with smaller fluctuations. As a result,
we expect the volatility of adjustment to be affected relatively more by restrictions to adjustment,
in the form of regulations or otherwise.
The first part of our analysis relates firm dynamics, specifically firm turnover, and regulation.
We measure whether the response of firm dynamics to macroeconomic shocks is hampered by
the presence of burdensome regulation, taking into account the fact that the “natural” response
to shocks may vary across sectors. Because firm dynamics in Latin America do not seem to
differ much from dynamics in more developed economies, our question is not whether regulation
impedes the movement from firms in and out of the market, but instead, whether in the face
of large macroeconomic shocks, such as the shocks to terms of trade that hit Latin American
countries during the 1990s, firms have the possibility to adjust fully. If they don’t, the degree of
“turbulence” observed could still be intense, although lower than it would be in a more flexible
regulatory environment. For instance, if a negative shock hits the economy and a large number
of firms is pushed to the destruction cutoff level (so that they would normally exit the market),
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some firms may in fact remain in the market because dismissal and other bankruptcy costs are
excessively high, thus weakening the adjustment that would otherwise take place.
With this idea in mind, we estimate the following regression equation:
zc,i,s,t = γ0 + γc + γi + γs + γt + φ(Rc × turnoverUS,i,s) + vc,i,s,t (2.1)
where z is the ratio of firm turnover to the standard deviation of terms-of-trade growth over the
period 1985−2000, c = country, i = industry, s = size, and t = year. The regulation index in
country c, Rc, is multiplied by the average (employment-weighted) turnover rate in the US, also
divided by the standard deviation of terms-of-trade growth in the US over the period 1985−2000.8
We interpret the dependent variable as the level of adjustment beyond responses to exoge-
nous aggregate shocks, and that takes place because of technological progress, idiosyncratic shocks,
etc. This constitutes the “natural” movement of firms in and out of an industry, and is expected
to fall in the presence of stringent regulation. Note that in equation (2.1) the interaction term
accounts for the fact that firm dynamics may “naturally” vary across industries and sizes.
Regression (2.1) is similar in spirit to Rajan and Zingales (1998), in that the coefficient
φ is interpreted as the effect of regulation on the dependent variable relative to a reference, or
“natural” rate. Rajan and Zingales (1998) and following studies such as Klapper et al. (2004),
and Micco and Pagés (2004), use the dependent variable in the same category (typically industry,
year) in the US as the “natural” rate in the absence of burdensome or distortive regulation.9 Such
a specification allows for a difference-in-difference analysis whereby one can study the effect of a
change in regulation on the “natural difference” of the dependent variable between two sectors,
with the added advantage of reducing the distortion caused by measurement errors. We choose
the average (employment-weighted) turnover rate in the corresponding category in the US as our
8An alternative way to account for the effect of volatility on firm dynamics is to add the volatility variable to
the regression as an additional control variable, or alternatively, to regress turnover on volatility and then use the
regression residual as a new dependent variable. In auxiliary regressions not reported here, we found that higher
volatility is indeed associated with higher turnover, however, we prefer the specification above because it still allows
us to introduce fixed effects for country, industry, and time, whereas including volatility -which only varies at the
country level- would capture the effects of other unobserved variables.
9A recent study by Haltiwanger et al. (2006) using this methodology finds that the effect of labor market
regulations varies significantly over firms size: job turnover in medium and large firms falls relatively more in
countries that have more stringent regulations, while small firms do not display significant differences.
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“natural” reference level in all regressions. We have two reasons for doing so: first, because US
data are available for a smaller number of years (1990-1997 for dynamics; 1992 and 1997 for
productivity) we use the average values, thereby abstracting from cyclical changes of the “natural”
rate in the US. Second, we prefer to use the same measure across regressions, and we choose
this particular measure over all others, because we start from the prior that creative destruction
(measured by turnover) leads to increases in productivity, so that we should observe a stronger
impact of regulation on productivity in sectors that are naturally experiencing higher turnover.
Our measure of macroeconomic shocks is given by the standard deviation of terms of trade
growth, obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators (2003). We believe this measure
to be preferable to, say, volatility of the real exchange rate, because it is the least subject to
endogeneity concerns. In addition, there is a positive, significant correlation between the volatility
of terms of trade growth and the volatility of GDP, suggesting that terms of trade reflect shocks
to the overall economy.
As described in the previous section, our explanatory variables of interest are indices that
quantify a country’s regulatory burden. We consider, in turn, product market, labor, and fiscal
regulation indices, where “product market” regulations include entry, trade, financial, contract-
ing, and bankruptcy regulations. In all regressions, we use the cross-country regulation indices
constructed in Chapter 1.
In the second part of our analysis we study how regulation affects productivity growth. First,
productivity growth can be directly affected by regulation, for instance, incentives for conducting
R&D or adopting new technologies might be hurt in the presence of excessive regulation. In
addition, if the movement of firms in and out of the market is really a “creative destruction”
process, then productivity growth increases (at least to some extent) as more firms enter and leave
the market.10 This creates a second channel for regulation to affect productivity: the effect of
regulation on firm dynamics will also have an effect on productivity growth.
To understand the direct and indirect effect of regulation on productivity growth, we esti-
10Things could be different if there exist frictions that give place to an inefficient selection process, as in Caballero
and Hammour (1998), Ouyang (2004), and Chapter 3 of this thesis.
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mate the following regression equations:
yc,t = α0 + γ1 ln(GDPc) + γ2avtotgrc,t + γ3outgapc,t + β(Rc × turnoverUS) + εc,t (2.2)
yc,t = α0 + γ1 ln(GDPc) + γ2avtotgrc,t + γ3outgapc,t + β(
turnoverc,t−5
sdtotgrc,5
) + εc,t (2.3)
where y is the dependent variable (each component of the labor productivity growth decomposition
equation), and t represents the end year of a 5−year period. As in regression (2.1), the regulation
index in country c is multiplied by the average rate of (employment-weighted) turnover in the US.
In regressions (2.2) and (2.3), we only use observations aggregated at the manufacturing level. We
include macroeconomic control variables, namely the average log GDP per capita over the period
(different for each country) to control for development effects; the average (annual) growth rate of
terms of trade over each 5−year period to control for exogenous external effects, and the output
gap over each 5−year period to control for cyclical effects.
In regression (2.2) , we explore the direct relation between productivity growth and regu-
lation; in regression (2.3) we look at the effect of regulation on productivity growth through the
channel of firm dynamics. To this effect, we use the log of the (employment-weighted) turnover rate
divided by the standard deviation of terms-of-trade growth in the 1985−2000 period. We estimate
regression (2.3) using ordinary least squares and also by instrumental variable estimation, where
our instruments are in fact the regulation indices. We discuss the choice of instruments as well as
the results of these estimations in the next sub-section.
2.4.2 Results and discussion
Table 2.1 presents the results of the estimation of regression (2.1) for firm turnover. The co-
efficients of entry regulation, lack of contract enforcement, and bankruptcy regulation are negative
and significant, meaning that in countries with more stringent regulation (an index closer to one),
firm turnover is relatively lower in (industry-size) categories that naturally display sharper adjust-
ment to shocks. Notice that the coefficients measure the effect of regulation on firm movements in
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and out of the market that are additional to responses to aggregate shocks.
The coefficient of labor market regulation turns out to be insignificant. This is not to
say, however, that labor market regulation does not have any effect on the absolute level of firm
turnover, but it does not seem to have stronger effects in industries that display naturally higher
levels of entry and exit for this working sample.11 On the other hand, the coefficients of financial
markets regulation and fiscal burden are positive and significant, which suggests that some forms
of regulation are associated with higher turnover in industries with naturally high turnover. This
result is not surprising, since stricter financial regulations typically reassure investors who lend to
entrepreneurs, and force under-performing businesses to exit the market. Additionally, our fiscal
burden index includes measures of fiscal spending, which in certain situations could be directed
towards business creation.
The last row of Table 2.1 provides the results of a comparative exercise that computes
the effect on the difference in firm turnover between two industries, one at the 10th percentile of
turnover, and the other at the 90th percentile, in countries whose regulation index stands at the
10th and 90th percentiles, respectively. The nature of the dependent variable makes the inter-
pretation of the numbers somewhat difficult, however, it is interesting to note that the strongest
effects are for entry regulation, while the weakest are for bankruptcy and financial regulations.
The last two columns of the table provide results for the regressions that include two insti-
tutional quality variables: governance, and political stability.12 Unsurprisingly, both coefficients
are positive and significant, showing not only that the general institutional quality of the country
matters for firm turnover, but that good institutions also foster firm movement relatively more in
industries that adjust naturally more.
11Regressions conducted in earlier versions that included a larger number of countries showed a negative and
significant coefficient for labor market regulation. These results are not included here in order to keep the sample
consistent across regressions.
12The variable “political stability” is a composite index of various measures from the International Country Risk
Guide, namely the presence of external conflict, the stability of the government, the presence of internal conflict, the
investment “friendliness” of the country, the presence of a military, or religious government, and the socio-economic







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We now turn to the analysis of the impact of regulation on productivity growth. The first
set of regressions look at the direct effect of labor, product market regulation, and fiscal burden
on the components of labor productivity growth. Results are reported in Table 2.2.
The regressions in Table 2.2 follow the specification of regression (2.2) but use industry-level
data organized in rolling five-year periods spanning 1984-2001. The regressions control for country,
industry, and time (period) effects. In order to identify the effect of regulation (which doesn’t vary
over time or industries), we assume that it is directly proportionally related to optimal, benchmark
turnover rates (given by those corresponding to the U.S.)






































































0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Log employment-weighted turnover divided by sd(TOT growth)
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0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Log employment-weighted turnover divided by sd(TOT growth)
All manufacturing - GR decomposition


























































































0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Log employment-weighted turnover divided by sd(TOT growth)
All manufacturing - GR decomposition




Note: the employment-weighted turnover rate was corrected by dividing it by the standard deviation of terms of
trade growth over the 1985-2000 period. The time coverage for each country is as follows: Argentina, 1996-2001;
Brazil, 2001; Chile, 1994-1999; Colombia, 1994-1998; Finland, 1994; France, 1994,1995; Netherlands, 1994-1997;


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Consistently with the analysis of Chapter 1, where we find evidence that business regulation
negatively affects per capita GDP growth, our results at the micro level suggest that some types
of business regulation indeed have a negative effect on the growth rate of output per worker,
and this effect shows particularly in the effects of regulation on the “reallocative” component of
labor productivity growth. The effects are particularly strong for entry, trade, and labor market
regulations, while financial regulation exert a positive effect on this component and the effect of
the fiscal burden is less clear.
To analyze the passage from regulation and firm dynamics to productivity growth, we start
by depicting firm turnover against the components of labor productivity growth in our sample of
countries. Figure 2.4 shows that there is a slightly positive relation between turnover and labor
productivity growth across countries, and this relation is more marked in the case of the “net
entry” component.
The results of regression (2.3) for the link between firm dynamics and productivity are
provided in Table 2.3. In order to emphasize business regulation information as the main source of
data variation, we work with country level data (at the manufacturing level). Also, for consistency
with the industry-level exercises, we work with the same sample of OECD and Latin American
countries organized in the same periods. First, we run OLS regressions of productivity growth
rates on firm turnover. Then, we run IV regressions of productivity growth rates on firm turnover,
where we isolate the variation of firm turnover due to business regulation. In both cases we control
for country and time effects by including as explanatory variables the output gap at the beginning
of the period, the level of per capita GDP, and the average terms of trade shocks.
The first panel reports results from the OLS regressions. When the full variation of firm
turnover is used to explain the variation of productivity growth, firm dynamics appears to have no
effect on productivity growth, except for the “between” component, where the effect is negative.
However, in the IV estimation reported in panel 2, when variation of firm turnover is limited to
the portion explained by business regulation (69%), firm turnover appears to significantly promote
growth in the cases of total labor productivity and its net entry component.
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Table 2.3: Labor productivity against firm dynamics
Ordinary least squares estimation
Dependent variable
LP Within Between Net entry Reallocative
growth component component component component
Average (log) GDP over pe-
riod
0.252 -0.18 0.608*** -0.176 0.432
[0.732] [0.539] [0.170] [0.249] [0.362]
Outout gap 4.185 2.609 0.534 1.042 1.576
[17.469] [16.233] [3.614] [5.461] [7.833]
Average growth of TOT over
5-yr period
-0.005 0.056 -0.066 0.005 -0.061
[0.159] [0.161] [0.054] [0.034] [0.074]
Log employment-weighted
turnover /sd(TOT growth)
0.068 0.173 -0.408*** 0.303 -0.105
[0.545] [0.467] [0.104] [0.192] [0.234]
Constant 0.935 3.907 -5.157*** 2.185 -2.972
[6.233] [4.558] [1.499] [2.165] [3.140]
Observations 51 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.06 0.06
Instrumental variable estimation
Dependent variable
LP Within Between Net entry Reallocative
growth component component component component
Average (log) GDP over pe-
riod
-3.273** -2.083 0.493* -1.682*** -1.190**
[1.288] [1.405] [0.276] [0.356] [0.478]
Outout gap 18.549 10.365 1.002 7.182 8.184
[22.353] [18.957] [3.362] [6.929] [8.690]
Average growth of TOT over
5-yr period
0.163 0.147 -0.06 0.076** 0.016
[0.160] [0.149] [0.050] [0.037] [0.069]
Log employment-weighted
turnover /sd(TOT growth)
3.903** 2.244 -0.283 1.942*** 1.659***
[1.694] [1.623] [0.278] [0.512] [0.643]
Constant 30.467*** 19.853* -4.194* 14.809*** 10.614***
[10.615] [11.612] [2.344] [3.015] [4.044]
Observations 51 51 51 51 51
First stage centered R2 0.6855 0.6855 0.6855 0.6855 0.6855
Partial R2 0.2117 0.2117 0.2117 0.2117 0.2117
P-value of Hansen’s J statistic 0.25344 0.51788 0.00759 0.50258 0.00791
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Industries: all manufacturing
Countries: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Finland, France, Netherlands, UK.
Years: 1988-2001
Instrumented variable: Log employment-weighted turnover divided by the standard deviation of
terms-of-trade growth
Instruments: Product market regulation (mean of entry, financial, trade, contract, and bankruptcy
regulation indices), labor regulation, and fiscal burden.
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For the within component, regulation flexibility also carries a positive coefficient but not statisti-
cally significant.
2.5 Conclusion
The macroeconomic impact of microeconomic regulation has attracted renewed interest in
the academic and policy debate. Recent empirical studies have examined the effects of regulatory
barriers particularly those in the product market – on the growth rates of output and productivity
at the aggregate level, mostly across industrial countries.
This Chapter has focused on the mechanism linking regulation and labor productivity
growth. Much of the analytical literature points toward the dynamics of firm entry and exit
i.e., the Schumpeterian process of “creative destruction” as the main channel through which mi-
croeconomic regulatory barriers are reflected in aggregate economic performance. This Chapter
offers an empirical evaluation of this view following a two-stage approach, first relating regulation
to firm dynamics, and then assessing the effects of firm dynamics on productivity growth. In
contrast with most of the preceding literature, which has focused on the effects of product-market
regulation in industrial countries, here we examine a variety of regulatory dimensions and consider
both OECD and Latin American countries.
On the whole, our empirical results, using both sector-level and overall manufacturing data
on productivity growth and firm dynamics, are moderately supportive of the role of firm entry
and exit as transmission mechanism between regulation and aggregate performance. Regarding
the link between regulation and firm entry and exit, using sector-level data we find that entry,
trade, bankruptcy, and labor regulations, as well as the lack of effective contract enforcement
affect negatively firm turnover in sectors that experience naturally high turnover. On the other
hand, stricter financial market and fiscal regulations increase turnover in these sectors, relative to
others.
As for the link between firm turnover and labor productivity growth, we find that it is
positive (but not significantly different from zero) for overall productivity growth as well as its
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separate components, except for that associated with resource reallocation across incumbent firms,
which shows a negative (and significant) effect. However, when we restrict our attention to the
variation in firm turnover accounted for by regulation using an instrumental variable estimation
procedure – the positive effect now arises for both overall productivity growth as well as its net
entry component, while the negative reallocation effect ceases to be significant.
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Chapter 3
Uneven Regulation Enforcement, Firm Dynamics, and the Productivity
Distribution
3.1 Introduction
How efficient is the reallocation process across countries?1 According to Schumpeterian
creative destruction theory, reallocation, either coming from firm entry and exit, or from the shift
of resources from contracting to expanding businesses, should increase aggregate productivity.
While empirical evidence shows that reallocation contributes positively to aggregate pro-
ductivity growth across countries, it also suggests that the contribution is smaller in countries with
an “excessive” regulatory burden (see Chapter 2 of this thesis).2 Moreover, many countries with
seemingly high regulation exhibit large amounts of reallocation, which raises the question of the
extent to which reallocation in these countries is efficient.
In this Chapter I study the effect of institutions on the innovative behavior of firms, and on
the efficiency of the reallocation process. Several aspects of the institutional environment affect the
cost of innovating, for instance, regulatory constraints, corruption, and political instability. I focus
on two dimensions of regulation: its magnitude, and more importantly, the arbitrary enforcement
of regulation across businesses, which I refer to as “regulation uncertainty.” While the effect of
higher regulation on innovative activity and reallocation has been explored in the literature, there
have been few attempts at understanding the effects of regulation uncertainty.3 The centerpiece
of this paper is the idea that higher or more uncertain innovation costs distort firms’ innovative
behavior, and hence introduce inefficiencies in the reallocation process that lead to lower aggregate
productivity.
1The term “reallocation” refers to labor and capital reallocation across establishments or firms. In this paper I
focus on two measures of reallocation: firm turnover (the sum of entry and exit), and productivity dispersion.
2The contribution of firm entry and exit is typically measured at a 5-year or longer horizon. See Bartelsman and
Doms (2000), Haltiwanger (2000), Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2005), and Bartlesman et al. (2005).
3For instance, Lambson (1991) studies innovative behavior under uncertain demand conditions, which could be
applied to the present context also.
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There is growing evidence that policy- and in particular regulation- uncertainty is a major
problem for entrepreneurs. To cite a few examples, the World Bank’s World Development Report
(2005) finds that in developing countries policy uncertainty is the most frequently cited “major
or severe” constraint to business activities. Hallward-Driemeier and Stewart (2004) find that in
Peru, 79% of firms surveyed by the World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment report that
the interpretation of existing regulations is highly unpredictable. More generally, factual evidence
suggests that firms often perceive regulation itself as a source of uncertainty. According to the
Economist Intelligence Unit (2005), regulation “has become a major source of risk” for businesses,
and “regulatory risk is seen by executives as the most significant threat to business, ahead of coun-
try risk, market and credit risk, IT and people risks, or terrorism and natural disasters.” Stringent
regulation is also likely to be unevenly enforced in countries with poor institutional quality, as
regulation stringency is positively correlated with widespread corruption, lack of an independent
and transparent judiciary system, and political instability across countries (see Chapter 1 of this
thesis).
While this Chapter does not directly address the political economy process underlying the
uneven enforcement of regulation, it is necessary to ask why such distortions exist in the econ-
omy, and more particularly, who benefits from them. As examples that follow suggest, uneven
enforcement can arise in highly unstable political environments, where either government officials
or incumbent firms can draw rents from enforcing regulations differently across firms. For instance,
it is not uncommon in countries with high corruption levels that incumbent firms bribe govern-
ment officials in order to receive “weaker” enforcement of some regulations (e.g., paying lower
fees). Such arrangements provide rents to government officials while allowing inefficient firms to
face lower operating costs and therefore survive despite their low productivity.4
A comparison of the privatization process that took place in Argentina and Chile illustrates
how regulation tends to be more unstable when it is implemented in a poor institutional context.5
At the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina began the privatization of telecommunications and utility
4This Chapter does not explicitly model such endogenous regulation enforcement, however this extension is
planned in future research.
5A detailed comparative analysis of the two processes is provided by Bergara and Pereyra (2005).
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companies (electricity, gas, water, and others), and regulatory agencies were created to design and
enforce the regulation of the newly privatized industries. However, regulatory agencies were partly
or entirely run by government bodies, and became hostages of political interests. Consequently,
regulatory policy was highly volatile. Agencies often introduced arbitrary changes in the rules and
violated established agreements, which resulted in endless legal disputes between the companies
and the government. Moreover, the judiciary had little independence from the executive, impairing
companies’ recourse to the courts.
In contrast, the Chilean privatization process was marked by the desire of the government
to develop a competitive market economy, with, for instance, the creation in 1973 of the Antitrust
Commission to ensure competitive behavior by private firms in all industries. Regulatory policy
-designed to increase competition rather than protect incumbents’ interests- has been highly stable
with respect to political fluctuations, and whenever deviations from established rules have occurred,
these have in general been predictable. The stability of the policy in Chile is attributed to its
high institutional quality, with a competent bureaucracy setting long-term goals and promoting
transparency, an independent judiciary system, and overall political stability.
These two contrasting examples suggest that the institutional environment in which reg-
ulation is implemented affects the ultimate outcome, that is, firms’ actions in the market. An
increasingly unstable environment will likely make firms more sensitive to even small changes in
regulation.
This Chapter takes a Schumpeterian approach to study the effects of regulation uncertainty
on productivity dynamics, by focusing on how uncertain innovation costs affect innovation deci-
sions, and the subsequent entry and exit of firms in the industry. While the ultimate interest is
looking at average productivity effects, I also look at productivity dispersion, as the latter captures
important characteristics of the reallocation process: that is, an efficient selection of firms should
cause dispersion to contract as cohorts grow older. Moreover, productivity dispersion also provides
information about the intensity of the “market experimentation” process: that is, a higher pro-
ductivity dispersion should indicate that firms engage more in innovative investment, which has
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random returns in terms of productivity gains. Recent studies, for instance, have documented that
young firms in the U.S. display greater dispersion of productivity relative to Europe, which ar-
guably points to a more intense market experimentation taking place in the U.S., especially among
young businesses.6 However, especially in developing countries, the empirical relationship between
regulation, market experimentation, and reallocation measures remains unclear, because of mea-
surement difficulties and endogeneity problems. I propose therefore to analyze the relationship
between regulation and reallocation in a theoretical framework that allows for firm heterogeneity,
and where the the industry is continuously renewed by the entry and exit of firms.
The model I use to explore the effects of regulation and institutional quality on reallocation is
based on Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). This class of models has several
advantages: first, firms are heterogeneous, which makes it possible to analyze the equilibrium effects
of frictions on the behavior of firms across different levels of productivity. Second, in equilibrium
the industry displays entry and exit, so that one can look at firm turnover and cohort effects.
Finally, although there is intense activity at the micro level as firms enter, exit, and explore
productive opportunities, the model produces a stationary equilibrium in which the characteristics
of the industry as an aggregate are constant.
My model departs from Hopenhayn (1992) in two respects: first, following Ericson and
Pakes (1995), I allow firms to engage in costly innovation to increase their future productivity,
thus capturing market experimentation effects.7 Second, I allow for uncertainty in the cost of
innovation (which captures regulation uncertainty). Specifically, in each period each firm receives
a random realization of the investment cost, so that firms with similar characteristics end up facing
different costs.
I begin by calibrating a version of the model without regulation uncertainty to match key
moments of firm dynamics and the productivity distribution in the U.S., my benchmark economy.8
6They also find that post-entry growth is higher in the U.S., firms are more heterogenous, and differences in
dispersion are more apparent in IT-intensive industries. See Haltiwanger et al. (2003), and Bartelsman et al. (2004)
7In contrast to other models of innovation, in this model there are no externalities or spillovers from innovation.
8Several recent empirical studies, such as Rajan and Zingales (1998), Klapper et al. (2004), or Micco and Pagés
(2004) have taken the U.S. as a benchmark economy when addressing frictions in developing economies, the rationale
being that the U.S. represents a relatively less distorted economy. The same argument is used in Chapters 2 and 3
of this thesis.
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Next, I analyze the effect of changes in the magnitude and uncertainty of the innovation cost on
firm turnover, productivity, size, and investment, for different cohorts of firms. Namely, I compare
the effects of a change in the magnitude of the cost (which corresponds to the “traditional” effect of
stringent regulation), versus introducing uncertainty in the cost in the form of a mean-preserving
spread.
I find that more uncertain innovation costs have similar, (negative) effects on average pro-
ductivity, size, and investment, than when the innovation cost increases because of more stringent
regulation. In equilibrium, uncertainty distorts the selection process by allowing some inefficient
firms to delay their exit, while some potentially good firms are eliminated from the industry. This
ultimately leads to lower aggregate productivity and innovative investment. Similarly, a higher
(deterministic) innovation cost reduces innovative investment at all productivity levels, causing
incumbent firms to receive lower future productivity shocks, and low-productivity firms to stop
investing altogether, leading to a drop in aggregate productivity.
Interestingly, I find that neither a higher nor a more uncertain innovative cost reduce mea-
sures of reallocation such as firm turnover and the dispersion of the productivity distribution. In
fact, both of them change the nature of the reallocation process, giving rise to strong inefficiencies:
uncertainty, by delaying exit of inefficient firms, and higher innovation costs, by selecting entering
firms (which tend to be less productive than incumbents) out of the market. Taken together these
results suggest that, in addition to the magnitude, regulation uncertainty is an important channel
through which institutions affect firm behavior. This paper offers therefore a possible explanation
for the limited success of regulatory reforms in developing countries, and suggests that countries
could achieve larger productivity gains if regulation uncertainty was reduced.
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of firm and productivity
dynamics across countries, as well as a comparison of institutional quality indicators, and discusses
the related literature. Section 3 describes a model of industry evolution, the calibration procedure,
and the numerical solution for the benchmark model. Section 4 provides results of the simulation
exercise when regulation is combined with uncertainty, and Section 5 concludes.
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3.2 Reallocation, productivity, and institutions
There is little question that the reallocation of resources across firms accounts for a signif-
icant share of aggregate productivity growth.9 From a Schumpeterian perspective this is hardly
surprising, since it is precisely the reassignment of resources from less towards more productive
units that is at the heart of the “creative destruction” process.
Yet, it would be incorrect to conclude that increased reallocation automatically translates
into higher productivity growth. Consider, for instance, firm entry and exit. Figure 3.1 depicts
turnover rates (i.e., the sum of entry and exit) in manufacturing for three groups of countries:
Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the E.U. and U.S. They show that firm turnover is equally high
among developed and developing countries, and sometimes higher in the latter. (Even abstracting
from the unusually high turnover taking place in Eastern Europe in the early transition years,
levels remain comparable to industrial countries toward the end of the 1990s.) This stylized fact
has been noted before in firm-level empirical studies: for instance, Roberts and Tybout (1996) note
that “the degree of flux in the manufacturing sectors of semi-industrialized countries is on average
greater than that found in the North.” More recently, Bartelsman et al. (2004, 2005) provide
detailed documentation on firm dynamics and productivity for a group of OECD and developing
countries, finding similar patterns. They observe that “[r]elatively high firm turnover rates are
observed both in countries with high income levels and/or high growth rates as well as in poorer
and/or slow-growth countries (and vice-versa).” This evidence compels us to examine whether
the observed measures truly reflect high competition and efficient creative destruction, or rather
wasteful reallocation.
9For the U.S., see for instance Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), Haltiwanger (2000), and Foster et al. (2001); for
other countries, Aw, Chen and Roberts (1997), Roberts and Tybout (1996), Tybout (1999), and more recently,
Bartelsman et al. (2004, 2005)
64








































































1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
year





Turnover rate in EU and US
(c) EU and US
Sources: Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2005), and author’s calculations
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Table 3.1: TFP across countries
TFP for entrants - 5 year span
Country Unweighted mean Weighted mean Dispersion
Brazil -1.11 -2.24 2.46
Chile -0.45 -0.12 1.20
Colombia -0.95 -0.15 1.14
Estonia 4.16 1.56 0.82
Finland 10.13 1.55 1.51
France 3.20 0.36 0.59
UK 6.12 0.92 0.51
Italy 2.05 0.50 0.57
Netherlands 2.47 0.68 0.40
USA 2.02 0.34 0.64
TFP for continuers - 5 year span
Country Unweighted mean Weighted mean Dispersion
Brazil -0.06 -0.49 2.31
Chile -1.04 -1.44 0.99
Colombia -0.73 -1.21 1.09
Estonia 4.05 2.56 0.73
Finland 11.54 11.83 1.70
France 3.12 2.73 0.40
UK 6.15 5.34 0.45
Italy 1.85 1.33 0.41
Netherlands 2.49 1.81 0.39
USA 2.04 1.88 0.61
TFP for exiters - 5 year span
Country Unweighted mean Weighted mean Dispersion
Brazil -0.95 -2.24 2.24
Chile -0.98 -0.24 1.17
Colombia -0.38 -0.09 1.16
Estonia 3.85 1.29 0.99
Finland 10.28 2.19 1.76
France 3.20 0.45 0.52
UK 6.05 1.45 0.49
Italy 1.69 0.51 0.47
Netherlands 2.34 0.72 0.43
USA 1.96 0.34 0.60
Source: Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2005)
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Another important dimension of the creative destruction process is productivity dispersion.
For instance, if selection effects are solely determined by market forces, the initial productivity
dispersion across entering firms should progressively contract as firms become more efficient, and
less productive firms are forced out of the market.10 Hence, the pace and the magnitude of changes
in the productivity dispersion can provide substantial information about the selection process. So
far, only a handful of empirical studies have attempted to find patterns in the productivity dynam-
ics of young firms across countries. Among them, Bartelsman et al. (2003) find that employment
in young American firms increases faster than in young European firms, and Haltiwanger et al.
(2003) find that the dispersion of technology investment per worker decreases with age faster in
the U.S. than in Europe, which is consistent with the fact that in the U.S. young firms display
greater productivity dispersion relative to Europe.11
Table 3.2: TFP relative to the U.S.
Entrants Continuers Exiting
mean sd cv mean sd cv mean sd cv
Brazil -12.581 3.715 12.969 -0.534 3.273 8.668 -10.454 3.402 9.392
Chile -1.440 1.889 2.758 -1.491 1.562 1.954 -1.439 1.958 2.876
Colombia -0.810 1.894 2.775 -1.291 1.879 2.680 -0.478 1.882 2.674
Estonia 4.488 1.282 1.440 1.771 1.177 1.262 2.538 1.591 2.009
Finland 5.380 2.090 3.346 8.037 2.528 4.767 8.335 2.293 3.868
France 1.321 0.983 0.976 1.745 0.814 0.759 1.752 0.930 0.905
UK 3.581 0.751 0.679 3.442 0.669 0.590 5.265 0.755 0.688
Italy 1.895 0.891 0.854 0.815 0.761 0.694 1.797 0.839 0.790
Netherlands 2.264 0.851 0.803 1.001 0.831 0.779 2.152 0.934 0.911
USA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Mean TFP corresponds to input-weighted mean of log TFP, calculated as explained in the appendix. The standard
deviation (sd) is the simple standard deviation of log TFP, and the coefficient of variation (cv) is the ratio of the
standard deviation to the mean of TFP (level) across firms. Source: Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2005)
and author’s calculations.
These facts suggest that young firms in the U.S. should have a larger scope for “market
experimentation”, that is, they should be better able to allocate resources to the search for the
best combination of factor inputs and technology. By the same token, in countries where barriers
to experimentation are large, one should observe (other things equal) a less disperse productivity
10This is the case, for instance, in the theoretical model of Jovanovic (1982).
11They also find that there is greater dispersion in productivity, payroll per worker, skill mix of workers, and
technology investment per worker among U.S. businesses that invest in technology most actively, than among less
active businesses, whereas there seems to be little systematic difference in dispersion between active and inactive
businesses in Germany.
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distribution among young firms, and a slower fall in productivity dispersion with age. Table 3.2
shows the mean and dispersion of TFP for a sample of industrial and emerging countries relative
to the U.S. While the argument appears to hold for most European countries, where regulation
is higher and dispersion is lower than in the U.S., it is less clear when emerging countries are
included in the picture, since they display higher regulation, poorer institutional quality, but much
larger dispersion than the U.S. Differences in regulation and institutional quality are visible in
Figure 3.3, which presents a comparison of governance and regulation indices described in Chapter
1. The dark bars represent a governance index that combines measures of corruption, rule of law,
and government accountability. The light bars represent an index of regulation that affects the
innovation process of firms (namely labor regulation, financial regulation, trade restrictions, fiscal
regulation, and the effectiveness of contract enforcement regulation). All values are between 0 and
1, where 1 is the worst measure in the case of regulation, and the best in the case of governance.
Clearly, a visual comparison of Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3 seems to contradict the claim that in
countries with more business friendly environments firms have more “market experimentation”
opportunities, and hence display a more disperse productivity distribution.
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Institutional Quality Indices
Governance quality Barriers to innovation
This is not to say that econometrically such a relationship is inexistent. For instance, Micco
and Pagés (2004) look at the effect of labor regulation on job reallocation, Klapper et al. (2004)
study the effect of entry regulation on firm entry, while Chapter 2 of this thesis looks at the
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effects of various regulations on firm turnover and on the contribution of net entry to aggregate
productivity growth. All conclude that, to some degree, regulation affects reallocation negatively.
However, results from cross-country studies that use industry-level data are subject to major
caveats: first, comparability across countries is often problematic, as data are collected separately
in each country, sometimes using different protocols.12 Second, the presence of measurement error
in dependent and explanatory variables (particularly in institutional variables) is likely to cause
biases in the estimated coefficients. It is therefore important to develop theoretical frameworks
that allow us to understand better the mechanisms underlying the observed relationships.13
Likewise, few empirical studies have looked at the influence of institutional quality on the
way that regulation is enforced. For instance, Chapter 1 of this thesis and Loayza et al. (2006)
find that labor market, product market, and fiscal regulation hamper GDP growth, exacerbate
volatility, and increase the size of the informal sector. Furthermore, the negative effects of excessive
regulation are aggravated in countries with poor governance. In looking at firm dynamics, Oviedo
(2004) finds that relaxing entry regulation together with improving institutional quality benefits
the entry of small firms relatively more, and this result is most significant in transition economies.
On the theoretical side, a number of studies have highlighted the role of institutions in
explaining inefficiencies in the reallocation of jobs. Bertola and Rogerson (1997) focus attention on
the surprisingly similar job flows, yet large differences in labor market legislation between Europe
and the U.S. They show that wage compression in the E.U., in combination with labor market
rigidities, leads to rates of job turnover comparable to those observed in the U.S., although workers
in the more rigid economy experience longer unemployment spells. Caballero and Hammour (1996,
1998) explore reallocation inefficiencies that arise because workers and firms engage in relations
that entail a certain degree of specificity; as a result, when the relation dissolves some of its value
is lost, which causes an ex-post holdup problem. They argue that synchronized job creation and
destruction indicate an efficient reallocation process, and they find evidence of inefficiencies in
the U.S. over the course of the business cycle, as job destruction outpaces job creation during
12One exception is Bartelsman et al. (2005).
13Schiantarelli (2005) offers a complete review of the literature on product market regulation and economic
outcomes.
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downturns, and depressed job creation lingers even as the economy recovers. The presence of
inefficiencies in economies like the U.S., with relatively few institutional failures, suggest that
in developing economies, which typically suffer from deep institutional deficiencies, reallocation
inefficiency may be quite large.
The analysis in this Chapter relates to two strands of the literature on “creative destruction.”
The first one evaluates the productivity gains from the wave of market-oriented reforms that began
in the 1980s across many parts of the world. Following the seminal paper by Olley and Pakes (1996),
who find that deregulation in telecommunications in the U.S. led to significant productivity gains,
Pavcnik (2000) and Bergoeing et al. (2005) find that trade liberalization (and other market-
oriented reforms) in Chile led to steady increases in productivity, coming both from within firms
and from the entry of new, more efficient ones.14 Likewise, Eslava et al. (2004, 2005a, and 2005b)
find that reforms in Colombia are associated with a more efficient selection process (especially on
the exit margin), although productivity gains have been modest.15 Kugler (2000) studies the effect
of the Colombian labor reform of 1990 on worker flows, and finds that hazard rates into- and out of
unemployment increased after the reform. Alonso et al. (2005) use a general equilibrium approach
to evaluate the impact of the liberalization of fixed-term contracts in Spain. They find that the
use of fixed-term contracts increases equilibrium unemployment, but also increases productivity.
The second, led by Aghion et al. (1992, 2001), focuses on the innovation process itself. In
contrast to these models, however, in my model firms do not innovate in order to capture rents,
but rather to survive the competitive pressure of outside, more efficient firms. To a lesser extent,
my model also relates to Parente and Prescott (1994), who study the effects on productivity of
barriers to technology adoption in a model with firm heterogeneity. Although their predictions
are similar in terms of average productivity effects, their model ignores the effects on reallocation,
since it displays no entry or exit, and they do not address the effects on dispersion.
Finally, this Chapter relates closely to Aghion et al. (2005), who study the effects of entry
14Recent theoretical work (for instance, Bernard et al., 2003, and Melitz, 2003) has supported these findings by
showing how, in a market with heterogeneous producers, lowering external barriers encourages the reallocation of
resources in favor of more productive firms.
15A possible explanation for this, as Bond et al. (2005) argue, is that in “crisis-prone” countries, like Colombia,
trade liberalization is often accompanied by surges in volatility, which distort the selection process and lead to lower
aggregate productivity.
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liberalization in India on the productivity distribution. They build a Schumpeterian model to
study heterogeneous firms’ innovative response to external competitive pressures. In the model,
external pressure causes productive firms to innovate more, while less productive firms innovate
less; as a result, increased entry leads to larger within-industry productivity dispersion, which is
corroborated by the data. However, my paper differs in an important aspect, namely the pres-
ence of uncertainty as a second channel by which regulation affects reallocation and productivity.
As I discuss later on, this second channel opens the possibility for inefficiencies in the realloca-
tion process, and shows that lowering barriers to reallocation may have smaller effects in a poor
institutional environment.
3.3 An industry evolution model
In this section I explain the industry evolution model I develop to analyze the effects of poor
institutional quality on productivity dynamics. The basic structure of the model follows Hopen-
hayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). The industry is characterized by a continuum
of heterogeneous firms producing a homogeneous good in a perfectly competitive market. There
is only one input - i.e. labor - denoted by z, and each firm produces according to a stochastic pro-
duction function f(s, z), where s is an idiosyncratic productivity shock. The production function
is strictly increasing in s and strictly concave in z, and satisfies fs > 0, fz > 0, and fzz < 0.
In the model, the optimal choice of the input z depends on current productivity s, and
output and input prices, p and w. We assume that w is exogenously determined, and, being in
a competitive industry, that firms take p as given (in equilibrium p is determined by the market




pf(s, z)− wz − pcf (3.1)
where cf denotes a fixed cost incurred in each period by each incumbent firm, measured in units
of output. The term pcf implies that firms with low current productivity will find it too costly to
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stay in the market. In fact, the presence of a fixed operating cost is necessary to ensure a positive
amount of exit in equilibrium; otherwise, firms with low productivity will choose to produce no
output and wait indefinitely until they get a favorable shock. In what follows, I choose wage to be
the numéraire and set w = 1. Thus, given s and p, rewrite the per-period profit as follows:
π(s, p) = pq(s, p)− z(s, p)− pcf (3.2)
where q(s, p) represents optimal production.
Next, I turn to productivity shocks and the process of “market experimentation.” Produc-
tivity shocks are independently distributed across firms with conditional cumulative distribution
F (s′|s, x), where s′ is next period’s productivity shock, x represents innovative investment, and F
is assumed to be continuous and strictly decreasing in s and x (Fs < 0 and Fx < 0). Innovative
investment can be interpreted as “active learning,” as firms invest to explore profit opportunities.
Namely, in every period firms may improve their productive prospects by investing a variable
amount x in innovation. Moreover, because innovative investment is an inherently risky activity,
it is assumed that a higher investment x increases the conditional mean but also the variance of s′.
The cost of innovating is quadratic and given by cxx2, where cx represents barriers to investment
due to the regulatory environment.
A poor institutional environment typically affects not only the mean (regulation related)
investment cost, but it also generates uncertainty about how the cost is enforced. As discussed
earlier, the uneven enforcement of regulation has many possible origins, such as corruption or
political instability. I assume therefore that, before choosing the amount to invest in innovation,
firms receive a draw from a random cost variable, so that cx can take two values, cx = chx (“high”)
with probability px, and cx = clx (“low”) with probability 1 − px, and cx is i.i.d.. The distance
between chx and c
l
x reflects therefore the amount of uncertainty faced by firms when investing in a
poor institutional environment.
Decisions are made according to the following timing: at the beginning of each period, before
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receiving any information, an incumbent firm decides whether to stay or exit the industry. If the
firm decides to exit, it incurs the corresponding (constant) bankruptcy fee, denoted by φ. If the
firm decides to stay, it incurs the fixed cost pcf , observes its current productivity shock s and
innovation cost cx, and makes production and investment decisions. The incumbent firm’s value
function can be therefore written as follows:
V (s, cx, p) = max
x≥0
{
π(s, p)− cxx2 + β
[
max{−φ,E[V (s′, c′x, p)|s, x]}
]}
(3.3)
where Es′ [V (s′, c′x, p)|s, x] is the firm’s expected future value over productivities, given the output
price and future investment cost, and conditional on the current productivity s and investment
x. The first order condition of the value function implies that the optimal choice of x depends
on the current innovation cost cx and on the marginal expected value of investing, given by the
(expected) marginal gain in productivity. In what follows, I denote the decision rules generated by
the maximization problem (3.3) as I(s, cx, p) and χ(s, cx, p), where I(s, cx, p) represents investment
in innovation, and χ(s, cx, p) the exit rule (so that χ = 1 if the firm exits, and χ = 0 if it stays).
Notice that, as π′(s) > 0, Fs < 0, and Fx < 0, future expected profits E[V (s′c′x, p)|s, x] are
strictly increasing in s and x. In addition, given the productivity shock structure chosen in section
3.2, a higher persistence of the productivity shock will, ceteris paribus, increase optimal investment
x, as the gains from investment are likely to last longer. Likewise, for a given persistence, higher
current productivity increases the optimal choice of investment, as higher current productivity
implies both larger current revenue and better future survival prospects. Finally, a higher output
price increases current and future revenue at all levels of output, thus increasing the optimal
amount of innovative investment x.
Let us now turn attention to entry decisions. There is a continuum of identical potential entrants
that decide whether to enter by comparing the one-time entry cost pce to the value of entering
the industry. Once they enter, they receive an initial productivity shock se, drawn from an initial
productivity distribution v(·), and then evolve as any other incumbent with xt−1 = 0. Initial
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productivities are identically and independently distributed across entering firms, so that the
expected value of the potential entrant is equal to:
Ve(p, cx) =
∫
V (se, cx, p)v(se)dse (3.4)
Hence, firms will enter each period if their expected value is larger than the entry cost. Denote
M the mass of entering firms in equilibrium, where Ve = pce. In this model, the previous level of
investment x is not a state variable in the incumbent’s maximization problem, although it does
determine the conditional distribution of the current shock s. Hence, the state of the industry
can be fully summarized by the distribution of firms along s and cx at time t, which I denote by
µt(s, cx). In the numerical solution, s is discretized, so that µt(s, cx) gives the the mass of firms
at each productivity level and cost. Moreover, given (s, cx, p), the decision rules I(s, cx, p) and
χ(s, cx, p) will bring the industry from state µt to a new state µt+1. The dynamics of the whole
economy can be therefore summarized by an operator T (µ,M, p), with µt+1 = T (µt,M, p), so
that one can define a stationary equilibrium by the values p∗ ≥ 0, M∗ ≥ 0, and µ∗ satisfying the
following conditions:
(i) entry satisfies Ve(p∗) ≤ p∗ce, with equality if M∗ > 0
(ii) the distribution over states is stationary, that is, µ∗ = T (µ∗,M∗, p∗)
(iii) the equilibrium price p∗ is determined by aggregate supply and demand, that is, Qs(µ∗,M, p∗) =∫
q(s, p∗)µ∗(s, cx)ds + M
∫
q(se, p∗)v(se)dse = Qd(p∗)
where the demand function Qd(p∗) is exogenously given, with Qdp(p
∗) < 0. The stochastic struc-
ture of the shocks in this model guarantees that, in the stationary equilibrium, the productivity
distribution and aggregate supply are constant. Thus, the equilibrium output price will also be
constant, and it will satisfy condition (i). Note that, by condition (ii), the number of firms in
the industry is constant. This implies that if a number M of firms enter each period, an equal
number M must exit, so that net entry is equal to zero. Finally, Hopenhayn (1992) shows that the
operator T is homogeneous of degree one in M and µ. Homogeneity implies that the equilibrium
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rate of entry –the ratio of M to µ- is independent of the actual number of firms, since, to keep the
distribution constant, doubling the number of total firms requires doubling the number of entrants.
To conclude, note that regulation in this model is captured by three parameters: the entry cost,
the bankruptcy cost, and the innovation cost. Arguably, the choice of innovation cost to be
the only regulation parameter that creates uncertainty is arbitrary. However, introducing similar
randomness in entry or exit costs would cause the equilibrium distribution to change over time.
Under this scenario, firms would have to take into account the entire productivity distribution in
their optimization problem, and the productivity distribution itself would become an additional
state variable, which complicates the numerical solution considerably.16 Moreover, introducing
uncertainty in either entry or exit costs should not fundamentally change my results, as additional
uncertainty is likely to make the selection process even more “noisy,” increasing the resulting
productivity dispersion. Next, I describe the algorithm for finding the equilibrium with entry and
exit, and the calibration procedure to generate the numerical solution.
3.3.1 Algorithm
To find the equilibrium values p∗, M∗, and µ∗, I follow the algorithm described in Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993), which consists of three steps. First, for an initial p and a given set of
parameters, I solve (3.3) via value function iteration. I integrate then the value function over the
productivity distribution of entrants to obtain Ve, and compare it to the cost of entering, pce.
If Ve > pce, I reduce p and solve (3.3) again, repeating the procedure until condition (i) of the
equilibrium is satisfied.
Second, following condition (ii), I find µ∗ up to a scale factor.17 That is, given p∗ and an
arbitrary number of entrants M̃ , I use the decision rules χ(s, cx, p∗) and I(s, cx, p∗) to compute the
transition function T (µ, M̃, p∗) that reassigns firms in µt to µt+1. Starting from an arbitrary dis-
tribution µ0, I reassign firms using T until a fixed point is reached. I call this invariant distribution
16Ways to simplify the problem have been put forth, for instance, by Krusell and Smith (1998).
17The linear homogeneity of T with respect to M and µ implies that, if µ̂ is the fixed point when M = 1, thenfMµ̂ is the fixed point when M = fM .
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µ̃.
Finally, I compute aggregate supply using the invariant distribution µ̃, and I compare it
to the industry demand corresponding to p∗ (condition (iii)). If Qs(µ̃,M, p∗) > Qd(p∗), I reduce
the number of entrants to reduce aggregate supply, and compute the invariant distribution for the
new M . I repeat the procedure until the market clears. The resulting M∗ and µ∗ complete the
stationary industry equilibrium.
The definition of the equilibrium in the previous section states that the industry could
display an equilibrium with or without entry and exit. Since the economies under study display
large amounts of entry and exit each year, it is natural to focus on the case generating entry and
exit in equilibrium.18 Hence, the choice of parameters for the numerical solution are such that in
equilibrium the industry displays positive entry and exit.
3.3.2 Benchmark model and calibration
I begin the analysis by calibrating a version of the model with constant innovation costs cx to
match a set of statistics for the U.S. There are two reasons for doing so. First, the goal is to study
the effect of distortions caused by poor institutional quality, therefore, it seems natural to begin
by studying a benchmark economy with relatively few distortions and good institutions. Second,
a multitude of studies have used similar models to reproduce patterns observed in the U.S., and
being able to compare their results to mine is of interest. I then vary innovation costs in the
calibrated model: I first increase them, and then make innovation costs random, and for each
case I solve the model and compute the resulting invariant productivity distribution. Finally, I
simulate an industry to obtain productivity and size statistics for several cohorts of firms. The
main parameters of the calibration are summarized in Table 3.3.
The idiosyncratic productivity s is set to follow a mean-reverting process of the form
st+1 = ρst + xtεt+1 0 ≤ ρ < 1 (3.5)
18Hopenhayn (1992) shows that the equilibrium with entry and exit is unique; on the other hand, in the case
without entry/exit, there is a continuum of equilibria.
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Table 3.3: Parameters for benchmark model
Fixed operating cost cf 0.9500
Bankruptcy cost φ 2.0000
(0.4634 in output units)
Entry cost ce 0.9000
Investment cost cx (constant) 0.0850
(0.0197 in output units)
Labor cost share α 0.5000
Discount factor β 0.9500
Idiosyncratic shock process
µε -5.3517
σε (at x̄ = 9.073) 1.4987





where the shock ε is an i.i.d. log-normal random variable and where log(ε) has mean µε and standard
deviation σε. Note that the distribution of the productivity shock depends on the amount x invested
in innovation last period, and, because investment multiplies the shock, it will affect the mean and
the variance of s.19 Notice also that if a firm does not invest, its future productivity declines
by a proportion equal to 1 − ρ: this captures the competitive pressure that outside technological
progress exerts on the firm, forcing it to innovate or exit.20 The pace of “technological change”
1/ρ has an ambiguous effect on the firm’s incentives to innovate. If ρ is low, the firm can only
survive to the extent that it invests to keep its productivity from falling; if ρ is too low, however,
the benefits of investing are short-lived, and hence the firm may be better off shutting down.
I make a discrete approximation for the process (3.5) by constructing a grid of 200 points
for s, and 250 points for x, for a given set of parameters ρ, µε, and σε.21 Since x is endogenously
19More formally, E(s|x = x0) = x0E(ε)(1−ρ) and var(s|x = x0) =
x20var(ε)
(1−ρ2) , where E(ε) = e
µε+
σ2ε






20While outside competitive pressure has been traditionally modeled also as coming from vintage effects, in this
model entering firms are less productive on average than incumbents, which is consistent with the data. Therefore,
it is assumed that outside competitive pressure is reflected in the pace at which the technology of incumbent firms
becomes obsolete.
21The large number of grid points for s allows me to have a wide range for s, yet with small gaps between the
grid points. This is necessary since the range of s widens as x increases.
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determined, I choose the grid such that firms’ choices are not constrained by the upper bound of x,
while the range of s is chosen so that its upper bound stands three standard deviations away from
the mean when x is equal to its upper bound. I then construct a matrix of transition probabilities
for each value of x, so that a total of 250 matrices of dimension 200-by-200 were constructed.
The parameters ρ, µε, and σε are chosen to match the estimates of the first and second
moments of the profitability shock process estimated by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2000), henceforth
CH, using data for approximately 7,000 U.S. large manufacturing plants continually in operation
between 1972 and 1988. While the distinction between productivity and profitability shocks is
empirically important, in the model it is not, since p and s multiply each other (see Foster,
Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2005).
CH decompose the stochastic process of productivity into aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks;
here, I abstract from aggregate shocks, and only consider the first and second moments of the pro-
ductivity distribution, together with the persistence parameter ρ. Moreover, in contrast to CH,
the process (3.5) is conditional on investment x. I need therefore to choose a value x̄ such that
the mean and the variance of s, given x̄, match the estimated moments in CH. To do so, I set the
persistence parameter equal to that estimated by CH, ρ = 0.885. Then, I set x̄ to be 75 grid-points
below the upper bound of x, and for this value the corresponding remaining parameter values µε
and σε are chosen to generate a standard deviation for s equal to 0.88 and a mean value of 1.23.
Admittedly, the choice of x̄ is arbitrary. However, the choice of µε and σε adjust to x̄ so that the
resulting moments for s match those in CH. Hence, neither s nor the numerical results depend on
x̄.
In the model it is important to work with short time periods, as much of the effects of
regulation happen through selection of young firms, who either grow or exit. I therefore set the
time period to be one year, and attempt to match the 1990s. Accordingly, the discount rate β is
set to 0.95, which corresponds to an annual interest rate of roughly 5.26 percent. Although the
time period matches the measure of turnover rates and size distributions provided by Bartelsman
et al. (2005), the same authors provide productivity statistics only at five-year spans; to make my
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model implications comparable, I will also present the productivity statistics over a period of five
years. In the model, the production technology is standard:
f(s, z) = szα α < 1 (3.6)
where α is set to be equal to 0.5. After some algebra, firms’ profits can thus be written as follows:












where γ = 1/α. 22 Finally, in what follows I consider a linear demand function with intercept D,
so that Qd(p) = D − p. Recall from the previous section that the operator T is homogeneous of
degree one in µ and M . As a result, in equilibrium the entry/exit rate is independent of the actual
number of firms, and this number will vary across experiments.
The remaining parameters, namely the entry cost ce, the exit cost φ, the fixed operating
cost cf , the demand parameter D, and the initial productivity distribution v(·) are chosen so that
the resulting industry equilibrium matches the U.S. annual turnover rate, the size distribution of
firms, the employment distribution across sizes, and the coefficient of variation of the productivity
of entering and incumbent firms.23 Following Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), the initial pro-
ductivity distribution is chosen to be uniform over the lower third of the productivity range for
incumbents. Having a lower average productivity for entrants guarantees that the size distribution
of entrants displays a lower average than for incumbents. In addition, it is reasonable to assume
that, on average, entrants start off less productive, and are more likely to exit, than incumbents,
as the data show for the U.S. and other countries. The innovation cost cx (constant in the bench-
mark case) is set so that the average expenditure on investment relative to sales matches the U.S.
R&D expenditure-to-sales ratio for manufacturing firms performing R&D in 2000, reported by the
National Science Foundation ’s Research and Development in Industry (see the Appendix).
22The reason to set the share of labor at 0.5 is that profit should not increase in x faster than the cost of x, which
is quadratic. From equation (3.7), we can see that profit is quadratic in x when α is 0.5
23“Size” is defined by employment z.
80
With the parameters in hand, I proceed to solve the model numerically as described previ-
ously. That is, I solve the firm’s problem by value function iteration, obtain the policy functions χ
for exit and I for investment, and calculate the invariant productivity distribution and the equilib-
rium firm entry/exit rate. The policy functions and invariant distribution also allow me to compute
the distribution of firms over different size categories, as well as the share of total employment that
each size category accounts for.
Next, I simulate a panel of firms and compute statistics for entering, continuing and exiting
firms by cohort. The simulated industry consists of 500 firms, and it is simulated for 500 periods,
where I discard the first 50 periods to eliminate the influence of the initial distribution.24 In each
period I use the exit rule χ to determine the number of firms that exit, and replace those firms by
an equal number of entrants. Using the investment rule I, I calculate investment decisions for each
incumbent and entering firm, which in turn determine the conditional probability distribution of
shocks for the period after. Then, in each period, each firm receives an idiosyncratic shock, drawn
from the probability distribution implied by last period’s investment (for entering firms, the shock
is a draw from a uniform distribution, with upper bound set at the lower third of the incumbents’
productivity range). I then construct productivity statistics (mean and dispersion) in the same
manner as Bartelsman et al. (2005), by considering as entrants all firms that entered between t
and t − 5, continuers all firms that are observed between t − 5 and t + 5, and exiting firms all
firms that exit between t and t + 5 (see the Appendix). I also calculate the average and standard
deviation of size, productivity, and investment for different cohorts of continuing firms.
In the next section I introduce institutional quality by, first, allowing the investment cost
to increase, and, second, by allowing the investment cost to be a random variable. Using the same
set of parameters as in the benchmark model, I then compare the resulting invariant distribution
to that of the benchmark model. I also report the results of simulation exercises that provide size,
productivity, and investment statistics for several cohorts of firms.
24Although the sample size for this simulation might seem small, it is computationally difficult to increase it much
further, because the productivity shock must be computed individually for each firm; in addition, one must be able
to track each firm over its lifetime in order to establish the entering, continuing and exiting cohorts. Alternative
simulations with a larger sample but less time periods show similar results, and in future work I plan to increase
the sample further and repeat the simulation several times in order to obtain more robust results.
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3.4 Results
Table 3.4: Comparison of basic statistics for the U.S. and benchmark model
A: Turnover and productivity distribution
U.S. Model
Innovative investment as a share of sales 3.74% 3.28%
Turnover rate 15.7813 15.6945
Coefficient of variation of entering firms* 1.0155 1.2746
Coefficient of variation of continuing firms* 0.9400 1.1087
Coefficient of variation of exiting firms* 0.9295 0.9131
B: Size Distribution
< 20 20-49 50-99 100-499 > 500
U.S.
Firms 0.726 0.151 0.061 0.049 0.012
Employment 0.067 0.068 0.063 0.145 0.657
Model
Firms 0.489 0.212 0.113 0.148 0.039
Employment 0.031 0.058 0.067 0.263 0.581
*The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of productivity s across firms, divided by the mean across
firms. As in the data, the mean and standard deviation of productivity are calculated for entering, continuing, and
exiting firms at 5-year spans. See the Appendix for details about the calculations.
Table 3.4 presents summary statistics in the data and the statistics produced by the cal-
ibration. The coefficient of variation for entering, continuing, and exiting businesses reported in
Panel A is calculated at 5-year intervals in the data, as well as in the model, using the simulated
panel. The share of innovative investment to total sales and the firm turnover rate are also re-
ported in Panel A. Panel B provides the size distribution of firms, as the share of firms in each size
category, and the share of total employment in each size categoty. Where comparable, the results
produced by the benchmark model are similar to Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). Most firms
are small (although the share of firms with less than 20 employees is significantly smaller in the
model than in the data), but most of the employment is concentrated in large firms. In addition,
the productivity distribution of entering firms displays larger dispersion (and lower mean) than
that of incumbent firms. To be sure, the parsimonious nature of the model makes it difficult to
82
Table 3.5: Statistics for alternative costs
Benchmark Constant Random Random
0.085 0.09 [0.075,0.095] [0.065,0.09]
Price 100 102.662 98.997 98.631
Firm turnover rate 100 114.905 99.913 100.436
Average overall productivity 100 93.418 98.935 96.314
Coefficient of variation productivity 100 102.022 100.688 101.796
Average size of firms (Employment) 100 94.255 96.708 92.162
Average investment 100 92.589 98.782 95.866
Dispersion of investment 100 96.772 102.532 103.368
capture many industry characteristics, however, the calibration fits quite well the main character-
istics that I am interested in studying here, namely the innovative behavior, the entry/exit rate,
and productivity dispersion.
I study the effects of a deterioration in the investment climate by first conducting a “tra-
ditional” exercise, where I keep the innovation cost deterministic but change its magnitude. In
the calibration the cost is increased from the benchmark case of cx = 0.085 to cx = 0.09 (a 5.6%
change). Keeping all other parameters unchanged, I solve the model, obtain the invariant dis-
tribution, and simulate a new industry. Results are reported in the second column of Table 3.5,
where all results are relative to the benchmark case. Firm turnover increases by 15% with respect
to the benchmark setup, while average productivity falls by 6.58%, and dispersion (measured by
the coefficient of variation) actually increases by 2%. Intuitively, all firms invest lower amounts in
innovation, which has two consequences. First, incumbent firms receive lower future productivity
shocks, which reduces aggregate productivity; second, investment of firms that are close to the exit
cutoff level (many of them entrants) drops to zero, forcing these firms to exit more rapidly (hence
the cutoff productivity level increases). Because in equilibrium the number of firms is constant ,
this increased exit also causes the composition of the industry to change towards a larger number of
young (thus small and less productive) firms. Overall, average investment decreases by 7.4%, and
because low-productivity firms are more likely to exit than to invest, the dispersion of investment
falls.
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Table 3.6 presents the impact of the higher innovation cost on productivity for entering,
continuing, and exiting firms. To be consistent with the data, the calculations are made at a 5-
year span: they therefore ignore the selection taking place at high frequencies, giving us medium-
term effects of the change in the investment cost. Interestingly, the drop in average productivity
is relatively larger for continuing firms, since their average productivity falls by 3.6%, while the
average productivity of entering and exiting firms falls by 2.9% and 1.8%, respectively. On the other
hand, while the dispersion of productivity for entering and continuing firms remains practically
unchanged, it increases slightly for exiting firms. This can be explained by the increase in the cutoff
productivity level, which also increases the range of productivity levels for exiting firms. However,
because the number of firms at low productivity levels increases, the average productivity of exiting
firms falls. The size distribution statistics, presented in Table 3.7, shows that the share of small
(z < 20) firms increases, as turnover is higher and most entering/exiting firms are small.
Next, I allow the cost to be random, taking values chx = 0.095 and c
l
x = 0.075 with equal
probability. Note that the average cost remains the same as in the benchmark case (cx = 0.085),
so that the only “additional” effect I consider with respect to the benchmark case is uncertainty.
Assuming that half of the firms get a high realization and half get a low realization is an extreme
example of the “capriciousness” of regulation; however, I study it as a starting point, and will
later provide results for an alternative case in which the probabilities of the high and low cost are
asymmetric, offering more realistic representations of the uncertainty caused by poor institutional
quality.
The third column of Table 3.5 reports the results of this calibration exercise. At first
sight, results differ only by small amounts with respect to the benchmark case. Firm turnover
does not change significantly (it decreases by less than 0.1%), the market-clearing price decreases
slightly, average productivity decreases by 1.065%, and the coefficient of variation increases by
0.7%. There are more noticeable effects for average size and investment, which fall by 3.29% and
1.22% respectively, and on investment dispersion, which increases by 2.53%.
In fact, although uncertainty does not affect average churning, it significantly affects the
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nature of churning, and the distribution of firms’ characteristics. Table 3.6 shows the effects of
uncertainty in innovation costs on the productivity of entrants, incumbents, and exiters. Unlike the
previous case of increased innovation costs, under uncertain costs it is exiters that see the largest
change with respect to the benchmark case. Indeed, the average productivity of exiters falls by
slightly over 4%, while the average productivity of entrants falls by about 2%, and the average
productivity of continuers firms falls by less than 1%. Intuitively, a fraction of low-productivity
firms receives a low cost draw, and hence are able to continue investing and delay their exit.
Moreover, a fraction of “potentially good” young firms receive a high cost draw, therefore stop
investing and exit the industry faster. As a result, average productivity of exiters falls. Investment
also falls sharply among exiting firms (16.5%), while it falls modestly for entering and continuing
firms (less than 3% for entrants and less than 1% for continuers). Not surprisingly, investment
dispersion increases for all firms, as firms face uneven costs in this setup. Table 3.7 shows that
the size distribution shifts slightly towards small firms, although less than in the previous case of
a higher cost.
I conclude the analysis by solving a more realistic specification of the model, where the prob-
ability of getting a high or low cost is asymmetric. In particular, the cost now takes values chx = 0.09
with probability px = 0.8 and clx = 0.065 with probability 1 − px. This specification corresponds
to a more realistic case in which the majority of firms face a high cost (relative to the benchmark),
and a smaller number of “lucky” firms receive a low draw of the cost. While in this model all firms
face the same probability structure, which would not be the case if regulation enforcement were
endogenous, the asymmetric probability case can be interpreted as uneven enforcement coming
over which the firm has no influence, for instance, due to an ineffective bureaucracy subject to
volatile, inconsistent policies.
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Figures 3.4(a) and 3.4(b) show the policy function for investment for the benchmark model
and the random cost with asymmetric probabilities. For the latter case, an “average” investment
rule is plotted in Figure 3.4(a) instead of the policy rules for clx and c
h
x, since it is the average
investment that determines the equilibrium productivity distribution.25 In Figure 3.4(b) however,
the investment rule is plotted separately for firms with clx and c
h
x and the figure focuses on the
decision of firms whose productivity is around the exit cutoff level (between 0.8 and 0.9, being
slightly lower for the random cost case). Note that the graphs do not display smooth lines due
to the discretization of the state-space. Interestingly, firms with clx invest always more than firms
with the benchmark cost, and firms with chx invest always less, but the “average” rule depicted in
Figure 3.4(b) is systematically below the benchmark rule.
Figures 3.5(a) and 3.5(b) display the distribution of investment across firms and the cumu-
lative investment for low-productivity firms, respectively. Although the differences appear to be
generally small, the distribution of investment in the deterministic (but high-cost) and random
cases show a slight shift to the left (Figure 3.5(a)), and there is a visible mass of investment at zero
25Note that innovative investment does not monotonically increase in productivity, this is due to the quadratic
cost of investment.
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for low productivity levels (Figure 3.5(b)), because firms receiving bad productivity shocks will
opt to exit the industry and hence invest zero. In contrast to the deterministic case, however, the
distribution of investment in the random cost cases shows that the gap between zero and positive
investment is smaller, since firms with low productivity that receive the low cost draw will invest
a positive amount instead of exiting. This is consistent with the fact that aggregate investment
decreases for exiting firms, as shown in Table 3.6, because among exiting firms that invest positive
amounts, the amount invested is lower than in the benchmark case.
Figure 3.6 shows the productivity distribution for firms near the exit cutoff level, for each
of the deterministic and random cases discussed above. Consistently with previous results, the
distribution of firms shifts towards the left in the random cases, as we observe a larger share of
firms at low productivity levels. This explains the larger drop in aggregate productivity for the
exiting firm cohort in the random cost case (see the last two columns of Table 3.6), since exiting
firms will typically be significantly less productive compared to exiting firms in the benchmark
case.
The overall effects of this setup are summarized in column 4 of Table 3.5. The effect
of turnover is more marked than in the previous case, although the increase is not significant
(0.44%). Average productivity, however, falls by 3.69%, while productivity dispersion increases by
1.8%, and more importantly, average size falls by over 7.84%. Average investment also falls more
markedly (4.13%), while the dispersion of investment increases by 3.36%.
The simulation results in Table 3.6 provide a striking view of of how asymmetric random
costs affect different groups of firms. First, average productivity of falls by 2.8% for entrants, 4.5%
for continuers, and 7.1% for exiters. These results are similar in nature but more marked with
respect to the symmetric random cost, in that exiting firms tend to be less productive because
low-productivity firms that are “lucky” enough to receive a low draw of the cost are able to invest
and remain above the exit cutoff level for a longer time, while “unlucky” young firms are forced
out of the industry too quickly. The resulting size distribution –presented in Table 3.7- shows
that the share of small firms increases, which suggests that the number of low-productivity firms
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Table 3.6: Simulation results
Productivity
Benchmark Constant Random Random
0.085 0.09 [0.075,0.095] [0.065,0.09]
Entering
Average 100 97.140 98.123 97.201
Dispersion 100 99.925 100.545 100.303
Continuing
Average 100 96.354 99.617 95.506
Dispersion 100 100.402 98.780 98.476
Exiting
Average 100 98.153 95.970 92.876
Dispersion 100 101.502 99.713 98.053
Investment
Benchmark Constant Random Random
0.085 0.09 [0.075,0.095] [0.065,0.09]
Entering
Average 100 93.626 97.392 96.441
Dispersion 100 102.527 105.327 107.394
Continuing
Average 100 95.345 99.167 95.380
Dispersion 100 102.744 104.395 109.036
Exiting
Average 100 91.656 83.506 73.312
Dispersion 100 102.720 116.743 128.697
increases as less productive firms tend to be small. It is interesting to compare these results with
the case of the deterministic, but higher cost. Note that in the deterministic cost case overall
average productivity falls more, because turnover increases and all firms invest less; on the other
hand, the average productivity of continuers and exiters falls more in the random cost case, and
this effect is especially strong for exiters.
Taking into account the aggregate cost of the additional entry and exit generated by changing
the innovative cost magnifies even further the distortive effects of changing the innovative cost.
For instance, in the case with cx = 0.09 revenues for entering and exiting cohorts are 95.6% and
99.6% of the benchmark case revenues, but if we account for the additional cost of entry and
exit, revenues fall further to 91.4% and 93%. In the random cost case with px = 0.5 revenues
go from 96.5% to 96% for entering firms and from 91.1% to 88.4% for exiting firms, and in the
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Table 3.7: Size distribution
< 20 20− 49 50− 99 100− 499 > 500
Benchmark (cost = 0.085)
Firms 0.4895 0.2117 0.1127 0.1476 0.0385
Employment 0.0311 0.0581 0.0669 0.2625 0.5814
Constant cost = 0.09
Firms 0.5009 0.2096 0.1224 0.1296 0.0375
Employment 0.0318 0.0584 0.0775 0.2472 0.5851
Random cost [0.075,0.095]
Firms 0.4959 0.2102 0.1113 0.1448 0.0378
Employment 0.0315 0.0584 0.0669 0.2609 0.5823
Random cost [0.065,0.09]
Firms 0.5117 0.2058 0.1076 0.1387 0.0361
Employment 0.0330 0.0594 0.0674 0.2601 0.5801
case with px = 0.8 revenues decrease from 93.6% to 92.6% for entering firms and from 84.4% to
79.6% for exiting firms if we subtract the cost of entry and exit. This simple calculation suggests
that in addition to productivity losses caused by reduced investment in innovation, changes in the
innovative cost generate additional aggregate losses from the changes in the selection process of
firms.
The results in panel B of Table 3.6 show that on average entrants and continuers invest less
than in the benchmark case (3.6% and 4.6% less), and the dispersion of investment increases for
all three groups of firms, most notably for exiting firms. Indeed, it is particularly striking that
although the average productivity of exiting firms falls, its investment dispersion increases even
more than for the other two groups (28.7% for exiters, 9% for continuers, and 7.4% for entrants).
The results of this case show that firms that get the lower cost draw invest considerably more
than those getting the high cost, which increases the dispersion of investment, although altogether
firms invest less than in the benchmark case. For less productive firms the effects are larger
since firms that get the high cost draw typically invest zero. Finally, notice that compared to
the deterministic, higher cost case, entering firms invest more on average in the random cost case
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(column 1 vs. column 3 in Table 3.6), although the resulting average productivity is lower.
To summarize, on average, the effects of introducing uncertainty in the innovation cost
are smaller than in the case of increased deterministic costs. However, a disaggregated analysis
shows that the nature of churning changes: exiting firms display a lower average productivity
compared to the benchmark model, and the selection process of firms is distorted so that some
low-productivity firms delay their exit while others exit prematurely. Hence, in the presence of
unpredictable regulation inefficiencies arise in the reallocation process, even if the average level
of regulation remains unchanged, which highlights the importance of complementing regulatory
reform with improvements in overall institutional quality.
3.5 Conclusion
Why do we observe high amounts of reallocation (firm turnover, productivity dispersion) in
countries with high levels of regulation? And why have reforms in some countries failed to increase
the contribution of reallocation to aggregate productivity growth?
To answer those questions I build an industry equilibrium model where firms engage in
innovation, but face costly and unpredictable barriers to innovation. This added friction is intended
to capture poor institutional quality, and I show that it distorts the entry and exit decision of firms,
and their innovative behavior, all of which determine the equilibrium productivity distribution.
I find that changes in innovative cost (either in magnitude or in nature) increase firm
turnover and productivity dispersion. Thus, interpreting surges in such reallocation measures as
improvements in the “creative destruction” process could be misleading, especially in countries
where regulation is high and institutional quality poor. More importantly, the fact that uncer-
tainty alone can cause inefficiencies in reallocation offers an explanation for the limited success
of structural reforms implemented across developing countries in recent years, and highlights the
importance of combining regulatory reform with improvements in the overall institutional quality.
Admittedly, the model does not incorporate important aspects of the relationship between
regulation and firm dynamics: for instance, regulation enforcement, though uneven, is not purely
92
random in reality, as some firms are able to avoid compliance more often than others. Likewise,
this model abstracts from strategic behavior present in models of imperfect competition, such as
Ericson and Pakes (1995), which, in combination to institutional frictions, could generate important
implications for firm dynamics. Extending the model to allow for multiple effects of regulation and
institutional quality opens the possibilities for a more complete understanding of its ultimate effects
on productivity. Another avenue for further research is the collection of institutional measures
capturing the uncertainty associated to regulation, which could be used to test the predictions of
the model by estimating reduced form relationships. The challenge is then obtaining objective and
accurate measures of the “capriciousness” of regulation across countries or industries.
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Data used in calibration of industry evolution model
The data used to calculate firm- and productivity dynamics across countries come from
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2005).1 The data were collected as part of World Bank
and OECD projects to obtain harmonized, industry-level indicators of firm dynamics and produc-
tivity. The main advantage of harmonized data is that it provides the researcher with comparable
measures across countries, and it minimizes (as much as possible) biases due to measurement error.
For the calibration of the model and the subsequent comparisons, I use data for the manufacturing
sector, for all available years between 1990 and 2001.
Firm demographics
U.S. data come from the Census Business Register, 1990-1996.
Turnover : Firm turnover rates are computed as the sum of entering and exiting firms at time t,
divided by the total number of firms at t, where entering firms are defined as firms that were not
observed in t − 1, but are observed in t and t + 1. Employment-weighted turnover is the sum of
employment in entering and exiting firms at time t, divided by total employment at t. I exclude
one-year firms, as well as firms with less than 1 employee.
Size distribution: Calculated as the share of firms in each size category (< 20,20−49,50−99,100−
499, and 500+) with respect to the total number of firms, excluding firms with zero employees.
The size-employment distribution, is calculated as the share of employment in each size category.
Productivity
U.S. data come from the Economic Census, 1992 and 1998. TFP is measured as the (log of) deflated
output (measured as value added, deflated using 4-digit level price deflators), minus weighted (log
of) labor and capital. Weights are industry-specific and common to all countries, and they are
1Because their study describes the data in great detail, I only highlight the relevant features of the data for this
paper, and refer the interested reader to the original study.
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calculated as the average expenditure shares of inputs in the OECD STAN database (alternatively,
some calculations are based on country-specific weights). To mitigate the problem of having
different units of measurement, the units of capital are adjusted with a multiplicative factor, such
that value added minus payroll reflects a return to capital of eight percent.
Average and dispersion of TFP : Let A be the universe of firms, N the set of entering firms, defined
as the set of firms that are observed in t, but not in t − 5; C the set of continuing firms, defined
as the set of firms that are observed both in t and in t− 5; and X the set of exiting firms, defined
as the set of firms that are observed in t, but not in t + 5. Define wi as the share of firm i in the
industry (e.g., value added, or output share); and let input be the sum of input value at the firm


















R&D to sales ratio: Data come from the National Science Foundation (2000). It is the ratio of
total R&D expenditures to net sales of R&D performing companies in manufacturing, in 2000
(measured in current dollars).
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[80] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 1999. “The
Quality of Government,” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, pp. 229-79.
[81] Lambson, Val E., 1991. “Industry Evolution With Sunk Costs And Uncertain Market Condi-
tions,” International Journal of industrial Organization, Vol.9, 171-196.
[82] Loayza Norman, Pablo Fajnzylber and César Calderón, 2004. “Economic Growth in Latin
America and the Caribbean,” mimeo, The World Bank, Washington DC.
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